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STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION*
THEODORE F. BRILL** AND GERALD J. HAYES***
This article surveys recent statutory and case developments
in the field of state and local taxation. Particular emphasis is
placed on real property taxes and the impact of recent decisions
by the Supreme Court of Florida on the public purpose exemp-
tion of the leasehold taxation statute. The authors also report and
analyze developments in corporate income taxes, estate taxes,
sales and use taxes, and documentary stamp taxes.
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I. REAL PROPERTY TAXES
A. Valuation
1. JUST VALUATION
The Florida Constitution' requires that property appraisers as-
sess property within their jurisdictions at "just valuation."2 This
constitutional provision has been implemented by the legislature
through a statute prescribing eight factors to be taken into consider-
ation in computing just valuation.3 These factors are: (1) the pres-
ent cash value of the property; (2) the present use of the property,
and the highest and best use to which the property can be expected
to be put in the immediate future;' (3) the location of the property;
(4) the quantity or size of the property; (5) the cost of the property
and the present replacement value of any improvements thereon;
(6) the condition of the property; (7) the income from the property;
and (8) the net proceeds from the sale of the property.5
Litigation is common in the area of valuation. This prevalence
of litigation arises partially because the legislature has never stated
definitively whether the eight factors in the statute should be con-
sidered equally or weighted in some particular order. A recent illus-
tration of the importance of interpretations of the just valuation
statute6 was evidenced in Lanier v. Walt Disney World Co.7
The suit involved the Walt Disney World amusement complex
in Orange County, Florida. Besides owning the vast acreage which
the complex occupied in Orange County, the taxpayer, Disney,
owned a great expanse of contiguous undeveloped land in Osceola
and Orange Counties. Out of the total of approximately 27,300 acres
Disney owned at this site, 10,300 acres were in Osceola County. The
litigation involved the valuation only of the property in Osceola
1. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
2. The term "just valuation" is synonymous for tax purposes with "full cash value."
McNayr v. Claughton, 198 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
3. FiA. STAT. § 193.011 (1975).
4. FLA. STAT. § 193.011(2) (1975). This section provides that the assessor must take into
consideration applicable land use regulations or moratoria restricting development or im-
provement of property.
5. FLA. STAT. § 193.011(8) (1975). The phrase "net proceeds of the sale" is defined as the
sum of money received by the seller after deduction for all of the usual and reasonable fees
and costs of the sale, including the costs and expenses of financing.
6. FA. STAT. § 193.011 (1975).
7. 316 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
[Vol. 31:1231
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
County. Evidence revealed that the Osceola property was being
used a "[a] buffer to commercial development . . . . a vast water
storage area . . . for flood control and conservation . . . [and] a
psychological mind conditioner for the millions of visitors to the
theme park."8
The appraiser valued Disney's Osceola property at the same
rate as neighboring properties which were zoned agricultural and
held only for speculation. Disney contended that the appraiser
failed to consider either the present use of the property or the high-
est and best use to which the property could be expected to be put
in the immediate future? Additionally, Disney alleged that the as-
sessor failed to consider the quantity and size of the property. 0
The court in reaching its decision reasoned that for unused land
held only for speculation it was appropriate to consider the best
possible future use as an "expected" use in calculating value. Since
Disney was using the land for a bona fide purpose and was expected
to continue to use it for that purpose, the appraiser erred in figuring
value based on the same rate as the neighboring properties, which
had no fona fide use. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held" that in making an assessment all eight factors must be consid-
ered, that the "use" factor particularly was entitled to "great
weight,"'" and that the assessor erred in considering the best possi-
ble use where such a use was not "expected."' 3
The court's reasoning seems sound, but it raises another possi-
ble consideration. If the land in Osceola County is used in part as a
"psychological mind conditioner,"' 4 then it could be considered part
of the theme park. Accordingly, it could be taxed under the ration-
ale of Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Center, Inc.,"5 a case in which
the Supreme Court of Florida valued a parking lot at the same rate
as a shopping center, on the theory that they were an integral unit.
Using the Dadeland rationale in Disney, the land providing the
8. Id. at 61.
9. FLA. STAT. § 193.011(2) (1973).
10. FA. STAT. § 193.011(4) (1975).
11. The Fourth District adopted the final judgment prepared by the circuit court judge
as its official opinion.
12. 316 So. 2d at 62.
13. The court followed the definition of use as construed in Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.
2d 521 (Fla. 1965). Under that case only immediately expected, not potential or reasonably
susceptible uses, are subject to consideration. Id. at 524.
14. 316 So. 2d at 61.
15. 229 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1970).
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setting for the theme park could be viewed as an integral part of the
park itself, and therefore, taxed not as agricultural property but as
part of the park.
In another case involving the present and immediate future use
of property, Miami Atlantic Development Corp. v. Blake, 6 the court
upheld the assessment in question. The taxpayer executed and re-
corded a declaration of condominium for its luxury residential high
rise on the twenty-ninth of December of the year in question. The
property appraiser assessed the building as a condominium for the
next taxyear, which began on the first of January. The taxpayer
contended that since the building actually was being operated as an
apartment building on the first of January, it should have been
assessed as such, rather than as a condominium. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, rejected that argument because the stat-
ute requires that the assessor consider the highest and best use to
which the property could be expected to be put in the immediate
future, 7 and the declaration of condominium resolved any question
of the expected immediate future use of the high rise building."
Blake v. Farrand Corp. '9 also considered the applicaton of the
just valuation statute. In that case the taxpayer contested as exces-
sive the assessment of its real property by an appraiser because a
building moratorium precluded utilizing the land for the high dens-
ity purposes for which it was zoned. The trial court agreed with the
taxpayer, ruling that the assessment had been made arbitrarily
without reference to the factors enumerated in the just valuation
statute." The trial court fixed an assessment at a figure between the
values testified to at trial. The appraiser did not contest the trial
judge's ruling that the assessment had been arbitrary, but rather
appealed on the ground that the court cannot fix an assessment
between the values testified to at trial. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, affirming the trial judge's action, held that if
substantial evidence is introduced demonstrating that the assess-
ment is erroneous, the court may reduce it.
16. 334 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
17. FLA. STAT. § 193.011(2) (1975).
18. The court also noted that within several months after the first of January the first
sale of a condominium unit had taken place. However, this hindsight view should have no
relevance since the standard the statute prescribes is based on the expected use of the
property as of the first of January.
19. 321 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
20. Id. at 119.
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In Disney, the decision was for the taxpayer and in Miami
Atlantic, against. The same test was employed in both cases, that
is, whether assessment had been based on the highest and best use
to which the land could be -expected to be put. Thus, while the
manner in which seven of the eight factors for just valuation are to
be considered by the appraiser remains to be judicially determined,
the use factor has been clarified. For the use factor the appraiser
should look to actual, expected use in considering the valuation of
a property. Farrand Corp. has provided that where it is established
that an assessor has given insufficient consideration to the eight
factors in making his valuation, the court may adjust the valuation
if adequate evidence is provided by the parties.
2. APPORTIONMENT OF COMMON AREAS
Department of Revenue v. Morganwoods Greentree, Inc. " con-
sidered the issue of assessment of taxes on the common areas of
housing projects. In Morganwoods the residents of the housing pro-
ject in question each owned connected townhouses. These individ-
ual owners held fee simple title to their houses and to the lots upon
which their houses were located. The housing project also contained
common areas comprised of landscaped areas, parking areas, and
recreational facilities. The taxpayer, Tampa Villas, held fee simple
title to these common areas, and pursuant to a declaration, was
responsible for their maintenance. Each dwelling unit owner was
required under the declaration to pay a maintenance assessment to
the plaintiff. The declaration granted each residential owner express
easements in the common areas for ingress and egress, lateral sup-
port, vehicular parking, and recreation. The declaration also regu-
lated the use of the areas in question.
The property appraiser levied 1973 ad valorem taxes against
Tampa Villas on the common areas through use of the cost
method,2 which is the price an owner paid for property and the
replacement value of the improvements thereon. The trial court,
granting a partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, held that the
Florida Constitution 3 and the appropriate implementing statute"
21. 341 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1976).
22. The cost method is one of the eight factors to be taken into consideration in arriving
at "just valuation" under Florida Statutes section 193.011 (1975).
23. FiA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. This section provides for the "just valuation of all property
for ad valorem taxation."
24. FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (1975).
1977] 1235
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required the appraiser to consider the restrictive encumbrances held
in the common areas by the lot owners when valuing those areas for
ad valorem taxation.25 The trial court ordered the appraiser to re-
evaluate the property accordingly. The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed.
The supreme court grounded its affirmation of the trial court's
decision to tax each residential unit for the benefit of the easements
on the concept "that the residential units . . .[were] not usable
without the common areas."2 The court found the two "entwined
with each other"27 and analogized to the case of Homer v. Dadeland
Shopping Center, Inc.2"
In Dadeland, lessees rented space in a shopping center from the
taxpayer and secured for their customers the right to use parking
areas in the center. The supreme court found that the stores and
parking lots were go interrelated that "the land used for the parking
area . . .[was] an integral part of the shopping center and just as
important to its development as the land upon which the buildings
. . . [were] erected."2 Similarly, in Morganwoods, the court found
that the common areas to be an integral part of the townhouses;
therefore the value of one had to be included in the computation of
the value of the other."
25. The supreme court stated that it was unclear from the record to what extent the
beneficial use of the common areas and easements therein were included in the assessed value
of the dwelling unit.
26. 341 So. 2d at 759.
27. Id.
28. 229 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1970).
29. 341 So. 2d at 759 (quoting Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Center, Inc., 229 So. 2d at
837).
30. The Morganwoods court noted that in Dadeland the supreme court upheld the ap-
praiser's failure to value the restrictive convenants. It could be contended that this is the
factor of Dadeland for which the supreme court in Morganwoods is citing the case. If this
contention were true, then it would support the proposition that the court wants to tax Tampa
Villas on all the common areas rather than making the townhouse owners liable. The
Morganwoods case, however, seems to indicate that it was the property appraiser's challenged
action which was overturned by the trial court, and affirmed by the supreme court.
Furthermore, any reliance by the court on Dadeland to justify not severing the easement for
tax purposes is misplaced. The reason the court disregarded the easements in the parking
areas in Dadeland when valuing the property was because the parking areas were considered
an essential part of the store rentals. As such this commercial property produced the income
stream (rental income) on which basis the property could be valued for taxation. Florida
Statutes section 193.011(7) (1975) provides that the income from the property is one of the
factors an assessor should take into consideration in arriving at just valuation. Consistent
with this reasoning is the distinction between Dadeland and Morganwoods in terms of the
encumbrance. In Dadeland due to the close tie between the stores and the parking areas, the
[Vol. 31:1231
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In order to carry out the rule laid down in the case, the supreme
court directed the tax appraiser to "assess the value of the common
areas separately with an adjustment being made in the value of each
residential unit,"3' through the apportionment of the common areas.
The supreme court found that the appraiser did consider the
effect of the easements in valuing the residential units,3 but invalid-
ly exercised "his authority" 3  when he "did not adjust his valuation
accordingly on the servient common areas ' 34 of Tampa Villas. The
supreme court pointed out that regardless of the method of assess-
ment, the primary rule is that "the total assessed value of the entire
property should equal its just full value taken as a whole. 35 There-
fore, the aggregate tax liability of the individual owners and Tampa
Villas should equal the initial valuation, as computed under the cost
method.
Lastly, the supreme court stated that despite the adjustment
in valuing the residential units, "the responsibility of collecting the
taxes" on the common areas falls on Tampa Villas, the titleholder,
"through the assessment authority of its declaration. ' 3 This direc-
tion in the case is due apparently to the requirement that each piece
of property be liable for the taxes placed upon it. The supreme court
may have been concerned with the proper placement of a lien in the
lessee presumably was paying for the value of parking rights when he paid rent, and to tax
him on the value of his encumbrances would have been to charge him again. Indeed, it was
the parking areas themselves which were an integral part of generating the taxpayer's income.
Therefore, the easements therein really were no different than those created by the leases of
the stores themselves. In Morganwoods, however, since the unit owners were not renting the
property, there was no effect on the rental of the common areas. Likewise, the easements were
not producing income to the taxpayer as in the Dadeland case.
31. 341 So. 2d at 759.
32. The court stated that the general property tax law "seeks payments from only one
owner," and despite mortgages or leases on the property a landowner will be taxed as if he
owns the property in fee simple. The court emphasized, however, an exception to this
common law principles: "[A]n outstanding, appurtenant easement interest must be consid-
ered in determining the property's tax value." Id. at 758 n.4. As a result, the court concluded
that "[an encumbrance or restriction such as an easement will not per se reduce the
assessment value of land . . . . Rather, "[t]he encumbrance becomes one factor among
many the assessor must consider in determining the just value of the property to be taxed."
Id. at 758.
33. Id. at 759.
34. Id. The court's directions seem to indicate that the assessor should value the property
via the cost method and apportion the total, which benefited the townhouses, among their
owners. The assessor then would subtract this total from the assessment on the common area.
35. Id. at 758.
36. Id. at 759.
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event of the nonpayment of taxes. Normally, a lien would be placed
on the townhouse if the taxeg levied on it were not paid. The court
probably believed that it would be improper to place a lien for the
value of the easements in the common areas either on a townhouse
or on the common areas themselves. By placing responsibility for
collection on the taxpayer owning the common areas, the court ap-
parently believed enforcement could best be ensured through the
taxpayer's "continuing lien"37 on each residential unit.
If the court's desire was to collect the taxes in the easiest man-
ner, at least two methods seem less complex. First, the appraiser
could value the townhouses utilizing the fair market value ap-
proach."8 In utilizing fair market value, courts normally look to fac-
tors such as the price for which the property would sell or the price
for which similar property with similar facilities has been selling
(comparable sales)." Second, the appraiser could charge each town-
house owner his pro rata share of the value of the common areas. If
the owner failed to pay the tax on the common areas, the appraiser
could place a lien on his townhouse under the court's recent decision
in Williams v. Jones" allowing for the attachment of a taxpayer's
nonassessed property.4
3. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The Supreme Court of Florida in Deltona Corp. v. Bailey4"
dealt, inter alia, with a property tax challenge based on equal pro-
tection and due process grounds. 3 In its due process claim the tax-
payer alleged that it lacked sufficient time to obtain a proper review
of the increased tax assessments that had been placed upon its
numerous parcels of land." Deltona, the taxpayer, did not assert
that the defendant, the property appraiser, had failed to comply
37. Id. at 757.
38. Florida Statutes section 193.011(1) (1975) labels this "the present cash value of the
property." Fair market value is the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the
property. Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 182 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966).
39. McNayr v. Claughton, 198 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3rd Dist. 1967).
40. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 97 S.Ct. 34 (1976).
41. See infra section I, D, 2.
42. 336 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1976).
43. The other issues involved the prospective application of Interlachen Lakes Estates,
Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1974).
44. The taxpayer received notice that over 8,000 parcels of land had been increased in
assessment.
[Vol. 31:1231
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with statutory notice and review requirements." Rather, the tax-
payer contended that the statutes themselves were unconstitutional
as applied to an owner of numerous parcels of land. The Supreme
Court of Florida noted that the statutory deadlines in question pre-
viously had withstood due process challenges.46 Furthermore, the
court stated that the deadlines were necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the tax collection system. The court held that the fact the
"deadlines work a hardship in situations where numerous parcels of
property are concerned is not a basis for . . .[establishing a viola-
tion] of due process." 47
A basic tenet of Florida ad valorem taxation law is that a tax-
payer's property must be assessed at one hundred percent of its
actual fair market value. A mere showing that parcels of other tax-
payers are assessed at a lesser amount will not induce a court to
reduce an assessment below one hundred percent. 8 The Supreme
Court of Florida, however, first in Dade County v. Salter" and later
in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. County of Dade,5"
was willing to grant such relief when systematic discrimination
against the taxpayer was at issue.
In Deltona the supreme court held that the taxpayer's allega-
tion that its property was assessed at a rate higher than that of
similar properties in the county was insufficient to merit relief on
equal protection grounds. The court indicated that in order for Del-
tona to have alleged a sufficient cause of action based on the equal
protection issue, it would have had to allege that substantially all
other property in the county systematically was assessed at a lesser
value than its own property."
The distinction drawn by the supreme court concerning the
significance of the Southern Bell and Salter decisions, both of which
found denials of equal protection, is noteworthy." Southern Bell was
granted relief, although its property was assessed at one hundred
45. FLA. STAT. §§ 194.011, .032 (1975).
46. The court cited Rudisill v. City of Tampa, 151 Fla. 284, 9 So. 2d 380 (1942); Dade
County v. Dupont Plaza, Inc., 117 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist.), rev'd on other grounds, 125 So.
2d 564 (Fla. 1960).
47. 336 So. 2d at 1169.
48. Id. at 1167. See also Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965).
49. 194 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1967).
50. 275 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973).
51. 336 So. 2d at 1168.
52. Id.
19771
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percent of just valuation, because it demonstrated that all real prop-
erty in the county was assessed at a median ratio ranging from
approximately eighty-one to eighty-three percent. Similarly, in
Salter the complaint alleged that, while plaintiff's property was
assessed at approximately eighty-seven percent of just valuation,
the property appraiser systematically had assessed all property in
the county at approximately forty-seven percent of just valuation.
Both Southern Bell and Salter are based on a discriminatioti
concept in that the appraiser set out to tax the plaintiffs at a higher
rate than other taxpayers. The supreme court aptly identified the
factor of systematic assessment of other property at a lower level
than the plaintiff's property as the key requirement missing in Del-
tona's allegation. In Deltona counsel for the taxpayer either erred
in not following the standard required for a sufficient allegation of
a denial of equal protection or believed that the plaintiff was incap-
able of proving the systematic discrimination required by the stan-
dard.
Another equal protection assessment problem was decided by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Spooner v. Askew.53 In that case
the Gadsden County Board of Tax Adjustment conducted a hearing
at which it adopted resolutions which in effect reduced the valua-
tion of all property in the county by thirty percent.54 The Depart-
ment of Revenue refused to follow the board's recommendation on
the ground that the board's power was limited to making recom-
mendations for reductions of valuation on an individual basis. The
taxpayers filed a class action for injunctive and declaratory relief on
behalf of all ad valorem taxpayers in the county. The trial court
granted partial relief, reducing the assessed value of the taxpayers'
property by twelve percent.
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the trial court and held
that there was no statutory basis for the county board's action in
adjusting assessments on an across-the-board basis. The court did
not agree that there was a violation of equal protection although
Gadsden County's taxpayers were assessed on approximately full
fair market value while the Department of Revenue had approved
tax rolls for other counties containing "assessments below the con-
53. [1976] FLA. L.W. (Jud. & Ad. Res. Assoc., Inc.) 1011 (S. Ct. Op.).
54. The basis for the board's action was its conclusion that lands within Gadsden County
were assessed at a considerably higher rate than similar lands in certain neighboring counties.
1240 [Vol. 31:1231
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stitutionally required 'just valuation.' '." Furthermore, the court
found no reliable evidence justifying a reduction of all assessments
by thirty percent. It added that "[t]he Board's concerns for re-
gional assessment parity are wholly irrelevant to its intra-county
function in the scheme of the tax assessment process."56The supreme court said that a taxpayer taxed at or under one-
hundred percent of fair market value has no standing to complain
about a lower assessment level being applicable to taxpayers of
another taxing jurisdiction. The court distinguished Dade County
v. Salter7 and Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. County
of Dade,5" in which the court provided relief to taxpayers who had
been assessed at approximately one hundred percent of fair market
value while others in their jurisdictions had not been assessed at full
value. The court distinguished those cases because the officials
there had not performed their duty of assessing property at full cash
value. The court said that in Spooner the taxpayers' complaint
centered on the official performing his responsibility too well. The
supreme court concluded that although the legislature's goal was
uniformity in assessment, the fact that the implementing
"procedures had not evolved to the point of flawless harmony...
was not a basis to conclude that . . . [the] taxpayers were denied
equal protection of the law under either the Florida or Federal Con-
stitutions."59
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida in the
Deltona and Spooner cases illustrate the hesitancy of that court to
find denials of equal protection and due process. These cases require
a showing, not only of a difference in assessments, but even of sys-
tematic discrimination against the taxpayer, to justify relief.
B. Exemptions
1. EDUCATION
Florida Statutes chapter 196 (1975)"0 provides for tax exemp-
tions for certain properties where justified by particular public poli-
55. [1976] FLA. L.W. at 1012.
56. Id. at 1012-13.
57. 194 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1966).
58. 275 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973).
59. [1976] FLA. L.W. at 1013.
60. FLA. STAT. ch. 196 (1975), as amended by FLA. STAT. ch. 196 (Supp. 1976).
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cies. The scope of one such exemption, education,' has been consid-
ered in several recent cases. In Walden v. Berkeley Preparato.ry
School, Inc., 2 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held
that a headmaster's residence was exempt from taxation, although
it was not used exclusively for either instruction or learning. The
court found it sufficient that there was regular and frequent use of
the property for educational purposes and that the residence helped
to foster a personal relationship between the headmaster and stu-
dents which was important to the educational process.
In Walden v. University of South Florida Foundation3 part of
the taxpayer's property was used for educational purposes and part
was used as an orange grove." The trial court severed the orange
grove from the rest of the property and held that the taxpayer was
liable for taxes on the grove. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, reversed in part, holding that under the applicable
statute 5 the trial court should have determined the ratio of the
property's nonexempt use to that of the exempt use and apportioned
the exemption accordingly.
2. AGRICULTURE
The agricultural classification is not a true exemption in that
the property is not exempt from taxation, but rather is taxed at a
lower rate. The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the constitution-
ality of the agricultural classification statute66 in Straughn v. K &
K Land Management, Inc.67 The circuit court had ruled that the
agricultural classification provision was unconstitutional for two
reasons. First, it found that the statute unlawfully delegated legisla-
tive authority. Second, the circuit court held that the exemption act
contravened the constitutional requirement that assessment be
made solely on the basis of character or use. The unlawful delega-
tion issue concerned a provision of the law which enabled a land-
61. FIA. STAT. §§ 196,192, .198 (1975).
62. 337 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
63. 328 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d. Dist. 1976).
64. Five acres out of a thirty acre tract were used for an orange grove from which the
taxpayer received approximately $200 a year from the sale of citrus fruit.
65. FLA. STAT. § 196.192(2) (1975). This section provides that "[aill property used
predominantly for exempt purposes shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent
of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use."
66. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1975).
67. 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
1242 [Vol. 31:1231
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owner, by a showing of special circumstances, to rebut a presump-
tion of lack of bona fide agricultural use. The supreme court stated
that the criteria in the statute 8 for the determination of taxable
status sufficiently limited the assessor's discretion; therefore, there
was no impermissible delegation. Concerning the character and use
question, the supreme court held that there is no mandatory re-
quirement that assessment be made solely on the basis of use. The
court noted that the special circumstances rule protects the inter-
ests of both property owners and tax appraisers. 9
The District Couut of Appeal, First District, considered the
assessment of agricultural timberlands0 in St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Conrad.7 Under Florida Statutes section 195.002 (1975), the De-
partment of Revenue has authority to establish measures of value
for property appraisals." Property appraisers in making assess-
ments are charged by that statute with following the standard mea-
sures of value established by the Department. Furthermore, the
burden is upon the appraiser "refusing to follow such standards to
overcome the presumption [of the standards' validity] by [a] pre-
ponderance of the evidence." 3 The property appraiser in St. Joe did
not follow the standard measures of value. The First District held
that the presumption that the standard measures of value should
be utilized is not shifted where the tax assessor is unable to relate
any standards or criteria which he used to make his assessments.
In St. Joe the appraiser's educated guesses based on aerial photo-
graphs, since they lacked independent appraisal by the county's
expert witnesses, were found insufficient to overcome the burden of
proof established by the statute. The court stated the rule that the
68. Florida Statutes section 193.461(3) (1975) lists the factors the tax assessor may
consider when deciding if the property qualifies for an agricultural tax exemption. These
factors are:
(1) the length of time the land has been utilized agriculturally; (2) the continu-
ity of the use; (3) the purchase price paid; (4) size as it relates to agricultural
use; (5) extent of commercial agricultural practices; (6) existence of a lease and
the nature of it; and (7) other factors that may become applicable.
69. For an application of the statute, see Walden v. Fletcher Ave. Dev. Corp., 313 So.
2d 65 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
70. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1975).
71. 333 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
72. Florida Statutes section 195.002 (1975) requires the Department of Revenue to exer-
cise a supervisory role over the assessment and valuation of property, so that it is valued
according to its just valuation. In pursuit of this power, Florida Statutes section 195.032
(1975) provides for the establishment of standards of value.
73. FLA. STAT. § 195.032 (1975).
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property appraiser has "to overcome by a preponderance of the
evidence the presumption that an appraisal through the use of such
standards is superior to the appraisal methods used by him in mak-
ing his assessments of the agricultural lands involved."'
C. Leaseholds
1. PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TAXATION
Several recent cases75 interpreted the new statute defining
property subject to taxation" as substantially changing Florida law
with regard to the taxation of leasehold interests." Prior to enact-
ment of the statute the leading case in the leasehold area had been
Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.7" In that case
the taxpayer, Pan American, brought suit against the county con-
testing the legality of taxing its leasehold interests at Miami Inter-
national Airport. The primary issue confronting the court 9 was
74. 333 So. 2d at 531.
75. Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 341 So. 2d
498 (Fla. 1976): Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975); See also Dade County v. Marine
Exhibition Corp., 330 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1976).
Several earlier cases found less significance in the adoption of Florida Statutes section
196.001(2) (1975). See, e.g., Walden v. Hertz, 320 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975); City of Tampa v.
Walden, 323 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Maccabee Investments, Inc. v. Markham, 311
So. 2d 718 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), quashed [19761 FLA. L.W. (Jud. & Ad. Res. Assoc., Inc.) 74
(S. Ct. Op.). The viability of these cases is questionable in light of the supreme court's
decisions in Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. and
Williams v. Jones.
76. FLA. STAT. § 196.001(2) (1975). This section provides that all leasehold interests in
property of the United States, state or political subdivision thereof, municipality, or other
political body corporate of the state shall be subject to taxation unless expressly exempt.
77. In this context the term "leasehold interests" applies where a nonpublic body is
renting real property from a public entity.
78. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
79. A preliminary consideration of the court was whether the Florida Constitution, FLA.
CONST. article VII, section 10(c), makes all leaseholds financed by revenue bonds taxable.
That section provides, inter alia, that capital projects financed through revenue bonds shall
be subject to ad valorem taxation to the same extent as privately owned property. The Pan
American court held that section 10(c) required implementation by the legislature before it
became effective.
Additionally, the court in Pan American was faced with a threshold question concerning
the taxability of the particular leasehold interests in controversy. The court held that the
leases, generally made in 1962 and subsequent years, were covered by a 1961 statute. 1961
Fla. Laws ch. 61-266, § 1 (repealed and replaced by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 15 (codified
at FLA. STAT. §§ 196.199(2)(a), 196.012(5) (1975)). This statute imposed taxes on property
which was exempt or immune from taxation but was used by private interests in connection
with a profitmaking venture.
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whether the leasehold interests were utilized exclusively for a public
purpose. The Supreme Court of Florida held that Pan American
exclusively used its facility to fulfill a "public purpose." The court
held that the applicable test for determining the existence of a
public purpose was satisfied where projects are primarily and pre-
dominantly for the public benefit, although there might be an inci-
dential private purpose."0 In Pan American the court implied that
regardless of Pan American's motivation and the profits it obtained
from its facility at Miami International Airport, the controlling fac-
tor mandating an exemption was the fulfillment of a public benefit.
The new statute" providing for the taxation of leasehold inter-
ests owned by public bodies first was tested in Straughn v. Camp.2
That case held that the passage of the leasehold provision 3 removed
the public purpose exemption where the use of the property pro-
vided little public benefit. 4
The taxable status of leasehold interests was upheld again by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Williams v. Jones.5 There, the
supreme court considered the scope of the exemptions provided by
the leasehold taxation statutes.8 Williams stated that the new stat-
ute's7 practical effect was to remove exemptions from "certain
80. The court cited Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965), as authority for this proposition.
81. FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1975).
82. 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974).
83. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 16 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1975)). Both the
session law and the Camp court refer to Florida Statutes section 192.010. Although this
section was never codified it is substantively encompassed in Florida Statutes section 196.001
(1975).
84. In Straughn v. Camp, approximately 700 of the 750 leased sites in question had single
family residences on them. Therefore, the supreme court was able to avoid consideration of
the public use question, as presented in Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973), since the private dwellings did not serve a public purpose. See
City of Tampa v. Walden, 323 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975). Straughn v. Camp also involved
extensive discussion on the effect of the repeal of the statute granting a special exemption to
the type of property in controversy.
85. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975). This case is a successor to Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d
689 (Fla. 1974), and the leaseholds in question are the same as those at issue in that case.
86. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012(5), (6), .199(2)(a) (1975).
87. FLA. STAT. 88 196.001(2), .199(2)(a) (1975). The latter section provides:
Property owned by the following governmental units, but used by nongovernmen-
tal lessees, shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions:
(a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state or any of
its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and
other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public
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users"88 of property thereby imposing ad valorem taxation upon
them consistent with that imposed on owners making similar uses
of private property. In Williams the leaseholders maintained that
they were fulfilling a public purpose as defined by Florida Statutes
section 196.012(5) (1975). 9 The supreme court rejected the public
purpose argument stating that "[tihe operation of the commercial
establishments represented . . . [here is] purely proprietary and
for profit"' " and that the operations of the commercial establish-
ments on the leaseholds "are not governmental functiong." ' The
court pointed out that such establishments would not be exempt if
they were located on privately owned land so no rationale existed
for exempting such profitmaking establishments on publicly owned
land.
Additionally, the court held that the exemptions contemplated
by the Florida statutes," "relate to 'governmental-governmental'
functions as opposed to 'governmental-proprietary' functions." 3
The accepted definitions of governmental functions and proprietary
functions were set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in City of
Clearwater v. Caldwell.!' In that case the court stated that purely
governmental authority must be utilized for a municipal purpose.
Power executed by a "municipality in a proprietary capacity...
must be for a public purpose."95 An example of an action that is
proprietary rather than governmental is a municipality's operation
of a utility." The test for a governmental function is whether the
governmental unit is acting in the same capacity as a private entity.
purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(5). In all such cases all other interests
in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation.
88. 326 So. 2d at 432.
89. This section of the statute provides in pertinent part:
Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be
served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in prop-
erty of the United States, the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any
municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state, is
demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could
properly be performed or served by appropriate governmental unit, or which is
demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be
a valid subject for the allocation of public funds.
90. 326 So. 2d at 433.
91. Id.
92. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012(5), .199(2) (1975).
93. 326 So. 2d at 433.
94. 75 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1954).
95. Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
96. See Erdis v. Sebring Utils. Comm'n, 237 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Raceway & Recreational
Facilities District97 presented the Supreme Court of Florida with an
even more complex set of facts concerning the issue of a public
purpose exemption for use of a leasehold interest. The property
involved, Daytona International Speedway, presented a situation
significantly different from that of the houses and commercial es-
tablishments in Straughn v. Camp95 and Williams v. Jones.99 In fact,
the public purpose issue concerning Daytona Raceway seems anala-
gous to the issue previously before the court concerning Pan Ameri-
can's facilities at Miami International Airport in Dade County v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc.' The Daytona International
Speedway is of obvious and particular importance to the Volusia
County area because it is critical in increasing employment and
bringing tourists to the region. Likewise, Miami International Air-
port is more than a typical transportation facility'"' since many
airlines have regional control facilities there, and it brings the vital
tourist trade to South Florida. Given the closeness of the fact pat-
terns of the Daytona and Pan American cases and the difference in
results, a reconciliation of the cases should have seemed essential.
Rather than utilizing the established rule and extensive reason-
ing of its earlier decision in Pan American as a starting point, the
supreme court in Daytona chose to start anew. In Daytona, the
Supreme Court of Florida traced the history of the state's treatment
of leaseholds in public property. After answering affirmatively the
threshold question of the taxability of the taxpayer's leasehold in-
terests, the court considered the secondary issue of whether the
property in question had been exempted. It noted that the constitu-
tion of 1968 had "limited the municipal purpose exemption'0 2 to
97. 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976).
98. 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974).
99. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1976).
100. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
101. Pan American in its case implied that airports are per se "public purposes." It
stated that modern airports render a public service similar to governmental functions, pro-
moting the health, safety, and welfare of the people.
102. The Constitution of 1885 had provided that "[tihe property of all corporations...
shall be subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious,
scientific, municipal, educational, literary, or charitable purposes." FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §
16 (1885).
The Supreme Court of Florida had occasion to construe this provision of the 1885 Consti-
tution with facts similar to those in Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational
Facilities Dist., 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976), in mind. It did so in Daytona Beach Racing &
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'property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for
municipal or public purposes.' ","13 The court stated the general rule
"that all property is subject to taxation unless expressly exempt and
such exemptions are strictly construed against the party claiming
them."'' 4 Therefore, there was a presumption in Daytona that the
leaseholds were not exempt.
The court pointed out that Florida Statutes section
196.199(2)(a) (1975) exempts "privately held leaseholds of govern-
mental property from taxation 'only when the lessee' ... 0 is dem-
onstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose
which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate
governmental unit, or. . .which would otherwise be a valid subject
for the allocation of public funds."'' 0 The supreme court relied on
the standards it had set for the leasehold interests involved in the
cases of Straughn v. Camp'017 and Williams v. Jones."'s These two
cases, as interpreted by the court in Daytona, laid down a two-
pronged nexus for testing whether property qualifies for an exemp-
tion under the governmental purpose definition. 10" The first part of
the nexus, taken from Straughn v. Camp,"" concerns the "use"
factor. Straughn v. Camp stated that "[ilt is the utilization of
leased property from a governmental source that determines
whether it is taxable under the Constitution.""' The court in
Daytona added that the utilization factor "is determinative" in
deciding whether the property is taxable." 2 For the second prong,
the supreme court looked to the purpose of the lessee. Williams v.
Jones"3 had found it determinative that the taxpayer's function was
Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965). There the court held that
the raceway was exempt from taxation because it was "a tourist and business attraction to
the area," therefore giving the facility a "predominantly public purpose." 179 So. 2d at 355.
Concerning the point that there was a distinction between the terms "municipal purpose"
and "public purpose" the supreme court stated that "such distinction is without a differ-
ence." Id.
103. 341 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1976) (citing FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a)).
104. 341 So. 2d at 502.
105. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 196.199(2)(a) (1975)).
106. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 196.012(5) (1975)).
107. 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974).
108. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975).
109. FLA. STAT. § 196.012(5) (1975).
110. 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974).
111. 341 So. 2d 498, 502 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d 689, 695 (Fla.
1974)).
112. 341 So. 2d at 502.
113. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975).
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"purely proprietary and for profit.""' In applying the Williams test,
the Supreme Court of Florida held that "[t]he lessee in the present
case does not serve a governmental purpose. The Corporation's op-
eration of the speedway 'is purely proprietary and for profit.' ""'
The court added that "[olperating an automobile racetrack for
profit is not even arguably the performance of a 'governmental-
governmental' function" compared to the "governmental-
proprietary" functions as contemplated under Florida Statutes sec-
tions 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a) (1975).11 In Williams the tax-
payer was performing a function that a private entity could have
performed. Therefore, the court in Daytona properly found the pur-
pose to be only a proprietary one." 7
The test enunciated by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Daytona is far more difficult for the taxpayer to meet to obtain a
public purpose exemption than the one adopted in 1973 in Dade
County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc."8 This difficulty is
particularly apparent in the test's second prong, the profit motive
of the lessee, which runs completely counter to the Pan American
test. In Pan American there was no evidence to suggest that Pan
American World Airways, Inc. was operating its leasehold for any
purpose other than that of making a profit. The court in effect
characterized Pan American's profit goal as merely an incidental
benefit to private interests which did not destroy Pan American's
exemption."'
The profit motive oriented second prong of the Daytona test
would seem to exclude exemptions under the public purpose doc-
trine for all but charitable, literary, religious, and scientific institu-
tions.'20 Under this construction of the law,'2 ' it is difficult to imag-
ine exactly what the legislature intended to exempt under the public
purpose provision since those taxpayers who would be exempt under
the provision 22 probably would have qualified under one of the tra-
114. 341 So. 2d at 502 (quoting Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425, 433 (Fla. 1975)).
115. 341 So. 2d at 502.
116. Id.
117. See City of Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1954).
118. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
119. Id. at 512.
120. Charitable, literary, religious, or scientific institutions are exempt from taxation.
FLA. STAT. § 196.196 (1975).
121. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012(5), .199(2)(a) (1975).
122. Id.
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ditional exemptions. 2 3 Apparently, the supreme court's answer to
this incongruity is that through the court's interpretation, "all prop-
erty used by private persons and commercial enterprises is sub-
jected to taxation either directly or indirectly through taxation on
the leasehold."'24 The court apparently believed that the legisla-
ture's intent was to exempt only those lessees engaged in noncom-
mercial activity, thereby ignoring possible public benefits of other
leaseholders.'25
Probably the most significant aspect of the Daytona decision
was articulated in a footnote in which the Supreme Court of Florida,
in reference to the public purpose issue, held that section 196.001
of the Florida Statutes (1975) "supersedes the statutory provisions
considered in"'29 Dade County v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. 27 That Florida statute, adopted in 197 1, 21 provides that lease-
hold interests in property owned by governmental entities shall be
subject to taxation unless expressly exempted. 2 ' It appears, how-
ever, that this statutory authority was not responsible for the differ-
ent result in Daytona. If the new statute really was the key, it would
have been unnecessary for Daytona to go through the same discus-
sion as in Pan American concerning the public purpose question. 3"
123. See FLA. STAT. § 196.196 (1975).
124. 341 So. 2d 498, 502 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425, 433 (Fla.
1975)).
125. If this were really what the legislature intended, it easily could have limited the
exemption in explicit language to lessees not in a profitmaking business.
126. 341 So. 2d 498, 502 n.5 (Fla. 1976).
127. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
128. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1975)).
129. FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1975). This section provides:
Unless expressly exempted from taxation, the following property shall be subject
to taxation in the manner provided by law:
(1) All real and personal property in this state and all personal property belong-
ing to persons residing in this state; and
(2) All leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state, or any
political subdivision, municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corpo-
rate of the state.
130. In Pan American the supreme court seemed to indicate that it would have found
the airline's facilities taxable if there had been a statute providing for the taxation of lease-
holds in public property as related to revenue bonds.
Regarding projects financed by revenue bonds, the Florida Constitution, FLA. CONST. art.
VII, § 10(c), pt. 2, provides:
If any project [is] so financed, or any part thereof, is occupied or operated by
any private corporation, association, partnership, or person pursuant to contract
or lease with the issuing body, the property interest created by such contract or
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Perhaps the difference in results between the two cases on the public
purpose issue can be traced to a change in the composition of the
supreme court. Justices Adkins and Roberts, in the majority in
Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., were the only
members of that bench who were still on the court in Daytona. In
Daytona the two justices dissented.' 3'
In Daytona, the supreme court ignored its earlier per curiam
decision affirming Walden v. Hertz. 3' Walden involved the lease-
hold of Hertz's automobile rental facility in the main terminal of the
Hillsborough County airport. The supreme court affirmed Hertz's
exemption from taxation on public purpose grounds.
Application of the Daytona test in Hertz would have brought
about a different result. Clearly, Hertz's rental facility was a profit-
making commercial venture and as such would have been denied
exemption under Daytona. The importance of the makeup of the
Supreme Court of Florida, illustrated by Daytona, was apparent
again in Walden v. Hertz. 33 Justices Adkins and Roberts, who were
in the majority upholding the leasehold exemption in Pan
American, were the only members of the supreme court to be a part
of the majority opinion in Walden v. Hertz.'34
Another important issue in Daytona was raised by the tax-
payer's contention that it should be exempt "as a matter of
lease shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as other privately owned
property. (emphasis added)
The court in Pan American did not have to reach the issue of whether the Florida Constitu-
tion, FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(c), required implementation to become effective. It stated that
the section did not apply to the circumstances of the case, because the revenue bond proper-
ties in controversy were created prior to the effective date of this constitutional provision. The
Pan American court noted that this section of the constitution providing for taxation of
leaseholds might require "implementation by the Legislature before it can become effective."
275 So. 2d at 508.
131. Their dissents were without opinion. 341 So. 2d 498, 502 (Fla. 1975).
132. 320 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975).
133. Id.
134. In Walden v. Hertz, 320 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975), the supreme court was composed of
three circuit justices, and Justices Adkins and Roberts, Overton, and England. Only Justices
Adkins and Roberts concurred in the majority opinion. All of the justices who were on the
court in Daytona and did not hear the Walden v. Hertz case were in the majority in Daytona
as was Justice England who dissented in Walden v. Hertz and Justice Overton, who wrote a
special concurrence there.
In his special concurrence, Justice Overton was concerned about what he saw as the
inconsistent position of the property appraiser in the case. The appraiser sought to tax Hertz's
rental facility at the airport while not taxing the restaurants and newsstands in the terminal.
Justice Overton added that he saw more logic in the position of Dade County, which as
amicus curiae argued that Hertz, as well as the businesses in the terminal, should be taxed.
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contractual right.'35 That argument was based on the City of Day-
tona Beach's agreement to "levy no tax upon the improvements
constructed by the [District] or upon the leasehold estate ...
created [by the lease between the City and the District], so long
as the same is held by . . .[a] public body."'36 The court answered
by stating that the City of Daytona Beach was "without authority
to bind the legislature";'37 hence, the lease was not effective in ex-
empting the lessee from taxation.
Daytona and Williams relied upon Florida Statutes section
196.001 (1975) to justify limiting the scope of the public purpose
exemption. The supreme court's two-pronged nexus test, especially
the profit motive analysis, generally will restrict use of the exemp-
tion to relatively few nonprofit entities. This result may be incon-
sistent with the general purpose of exemptions, which is to foster
beneficial public effects. The effects of the nexus test are contrary
to the 1973 Pan American case and indicate that the Supreme Court
of Florida's recent decisions may be attributable more to the change
in the court's composition than to the adoption of section 196.001.
2. SUBSURFACE RIGHTS
Florida Statutes section 193.481 (1975)138 provides for the taxa-
tion of oil, mineral, gas, and other subsurface rights. This statute
has been construed in two conflicting decisions of the District
Courts of Appeal.'39 The question presented in each case was
135. 341 So. 2d 498, 502 (Fla. 1976).
136. Id. (quoting the contract between the City of Daytona Beach and the Daytona
Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District). (Brackets inserted by the supreme court).
The District, one of the plaintiffs in this case, subsequently leased the property upon which
the raceway was built to International Speedway Corp.
137. Id.
138. The relevant section reads as follows:
Assessment of oil, mineral and other subsurface rights.-
(1) Whenever the mineral, oil, gas, and other subsurface rights in or to real
property in this state shall have been sold or otherwise transferred by the owner
of such real property, or retained or acquired through reservation or otherwise,
such subsurface rights shall be taken and treated as an interest in real property
subject to taxation separate and apart from the fee or ownership of the fee or other
interest in the fee. Such mineral, oil, gas, and other subsurface rights, when
separated from the fee or other interest in the fee, shall be subject to separate
taxation. Such taxation shall be against such subsurface interest and not against
the owner or owners thereof or against separate interests or rights in or to such
subsurface rights.
139. Fischer v. Sun Oil Co., 330 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); Straughn v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 309 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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whether the statute provides for the taxation of a leasehold interest
in subsurface rights.
In Straughn v. Amoco Production Co.,'4 the taxpayer sought
through a declaratory judgment action a determination that its
leasehold interest was not subject to ad valorem real property taxa-
tion under the statute. The trial court, following the earlier supreme
court decision in Miller v. Carr,' held that the leasehold interest
constituted a mere "license to explore" and was not subject to the
tax. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, distin-
guishing Miller and holding that the legislature could and did in-
tend to tax such leasehold interests.
The court characterized the lease as containing two distinct
parts-the right to explore the land and the right to extract from
the land. The court distinguished the Miller case on the ground that
it was only concerned with the right to extract.' However, such a
distinction is artificial. The right to extract from the land naturally
is dependent on the exploration thereof. The court should simply
have discredited the Miller approach.
Amoco Production rejected the contention that the statute vio-
lated the Florida Constitution,'43 holding that a classification of this
kind of leasehold interest as a "freehold" interest or estate in land
140. 309 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
141. 141 Fla. 318, 193 So. 45 (1940).
142. In the Miller case the lessee contended that the lease constituted a "constructive
severance of oil 'in place' and that title to the oil passed to the lessee." 141 Fla. at 324, 193
So. at 47. The supreme court construed the lease to be a "contract for the use of the realty
for the purposes therein specified. It passed the right to produce oil from the land and nothing,
more." Id. The Second District is correct in that Miller is concerned not with the taxation of
the minerals but with the alienability of the interest in the minerals which is defined as the
right to produce. Therefore, it follows logically from Miller that any tax must be on the right
to produce rather than on realty. Amoco Production's conclusion that the statute levies a tax
on the "exclusive right to occupy, explore and probe the land together with its interest in such
unsevered oil and minerals which, while so unsevered, remain part of the realty," 309 So. 2d
at 42, is inconsistent with the consequences of the Miller logic.
143. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a). This section provides: "No tax shall be levied except
in pursuance of law. No state ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon real estate or tangible
personal property. All other forms of taxation shall be preempted to the state except as
provided by general law." In Fisher v. Sun Oil Co., 330 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976), the
court construed this section to mean that "the counties may levy ad valorem taxes upon real
estate and tangible personal property in the county but all other forms of taxation are
preempted to the state unless by general low the county is given authority to levy such other
taxes. "Id. at 78. The court believed that the imposition of the county's tax on mineral leases
was unconstitutional because it was levied, without a grant of authority from the state, on
an interest in real property.
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"would meet the test of a reasonable classification for a valid public
purpose."'' It thus held the leasehold interest to be one in real
property and the tax to be on real property.
Amoco Production also held that the legislature intended to tax
leasehold interests in subsurface rights. The court looked at the
original wording of the section which included the phrase "not to
include a leasehold interest in said subsurface rights."'' Though
that statute was declared unconstitutional on other grounds,," when
the legislature reenacted a similar statute correcting the constitu-
tional defect,'47 it dropped the phrase prohibiting the taxation of
leasehold interests in subsurface rights. The court determined that
this was "intentionally done for the purpose of including leasehold
interests in the new enactment.""14 The court, therefore, upheld the
application of the tax.
In Fisher v. Sun Oil Co., 4' the taxpayer sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction against the imposition of a tax on its
oil, gas, and mineral leasehold interests. The District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, was presented with essentially the same prob-
lem as that before the Second District in Amoco Production. The
trial court, like the trial court in Amoco Production, followed the
Miller case,"'" and held that the leases were mere licenses to explore
and produce, and were not interests in real property. On appeal, the
taxing authority, apparently relying on the Amoco Production deci-
sion, argued that the deletion from the old statute'5' of the phrase
''not to include a leasehold interest in said subsurface rights" when
the legislature reenacted it in 1963,152 indicated a legislative intent
to tax those interests. The First District rejected this argument by
pointing out that the new enactment in 1963 had added a phrase
indicating that "[s]uch taxation shall be against such subsurface
interest and not against the owner or owners thereof or against sepa-
rate interests or rights in or to such subsurface rights."'53 The court
144. 309 So. 2d at 41.
145. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-150, § 1.
146. Cassady v. Consolidated Naval Stores Co., 119 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1960).
147. 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 63-355, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 193.481 (1975)). This
statute was upheld as constitutional in Dickinson v. Davis, 224 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1969).
148. 309 So. 2d at 42.
149. 330 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
150. 141 Fla. 318, 193 So. 45 (1940).
151. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-150, § 1.
152. 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 63-355, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 193.481 (1975)).
153. 330 So. 2d at 79.
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concluded that the references to subsurface rights should be inter-
preted to mean taxation of the mineral fee estates, and not taxation
of the mineral leases carved out of those estates. Because there were
strong doubts about the proper interpretation of the statute, the
court followed the general rule'54 that statutes imposing taxes must
be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer. Since it determined
that the legislature did not intend to impose a tax, it was not neces-
sary for the court to decide whether such a tax was prohibited by
the Florida Constitution.'55
It is submitted that the better view was expressed by the Sec-
ond District in Amoco Production. In order for a leasehold interest
in private property to be subject to ad valorem taxation, it must be
either real estate or tangible personal property. The supreme court
has decided that the "interests of lessees are neither tangible nor
intangible personal property as presently defined,"'' 6 therefore, the
leaseholds must be interests in realty if they are to be taxable at all.
The supreme court, in Dade County v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.,'5 recognized that a leasehold interest in oil, mineral,
or other subsurface rights was taxable.' In fact, Amoco Production
relied on the Pan American case. 5 ' Subsequently, in Williams v.
Jones,'"" the supreme court referred to Amoco Production, Pan
American, and Park-N-Shop, Inc. v. Sparkman,'' and refused to
accept the contention that the legislature was without power to
classify the leasehold interests in question as real property.'," It may
be concluded, therefore, that the legislature is not constitutionally
barred from taxing a leasehold interest in subsurface rights.
The next question is whether the legislature did tax such an
interest. Both Pan American' and Williams use language which
reflects the supreme court's belief that the legislature did tax such
leaseholds. Amoco Production comes to the same conclusion based
on its belief that the deletion of the phrase which exempts lease-
154. State ex rel. Riverside Bank v. Green, 101 So. 2d 805. (Fla. 1958); Overstreet v. Ty-
Tan, Inc., 48 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1950).
155. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a).
156. Park-N-Shop, Inc. v. Sparkman, 99 So. 2d 571, 574 (Fla. 1957).
157. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
158. Id. at 509 n.2.
159. 309 So. 2d at 41.
160. 326 So. 2d 425, 430-31 (Fla. 1975).
161. 99 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1957).
162. 326 So. 2d at 431.
163. 275 So. 2d at 509.
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holds from application of the tax evidenced an "intentional" desire
to tax the leaseholds.' 64
Since neither Pan American nor Williams found it necessary to
make references to Miller, it is submitted that the portion of that
case which classifies a lease as a right to extract as opposed to an
interogt in realty is discredited. Similarly, the Fisher interpretation,
to the extent it relies on Miller, should be disregarded. A leasehold
interest in subsurface rights should be regarded as creating an inter-
est in realty. It also appears that the legislature meant to tax that
interest. Therefore, the leasehold interest is subject to the tax.'64 .'
3. VALUATION
In Williams v. Jones'65 taxpayers contended that even if their
leasehold interests were not exempt from taxation, the tax imposed
by Florida Statutes section 196.001(2) (1975) was merely an ad valo-
rem intangible personal property tax.6 ' Their contention was based
on the fact that none of the statutory provisions relied upon by the
county in supporting taxation at real property rates expressly stated
that "the leasehold estates in question are to be taxed 'as an interest
in real property.' "167 The Supreme Court of Florida in Williams
indicated that it presumed that the legislature deemed it sufficient
to provide that "leasehold interests in public lands shall no longer
enjoy exemption from ad valorem taxation . . ." except as pre-
scribed therein.'68 Therefore, the court held that Florida Statutes
section 196.001(2) (1975) effectively taxed leasehold interests as real
property.
The taxpayers alternatively argued that even if the state in-
tended to tax leasehold interests as realty, it was without the power
164. 309 So. 2d at 42.
164.1. While this article was being printed the supreme court announced a decision in
Straugh v. Sun Oil Co., [1977] FLA. L.W. (Jud. & Ad. Res. Assoc., Inc.) 207 (S. Ct. Op.).
This decision affirmed Amoco Production and reversed Fisher for essentially the reasons
given in the portion of the text accompanying notes 156-164. This decision awaits action on
a motion for rehearing.
165. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 34 (1976).
166. 326 So. 2d at 433. The rates for intangible personal property taxation are much
lower than the rates for real property taxation. Id. at 431.
167. Id. at 433.
168. Id. at 435. In reaching such a conclusion, the court noted that it presumed that when
the legislature enacted the statute, the legislature was cognizant of the existing law, as well
as judicial constructions of former laws.
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to do so.' The taxpayers relied on Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc.
v. Snyder"' in support of the proposition that the legislature, as-
suming it had the power to tax the leaseholds, could not tax them
at a value based on the fair market value of the property itself. "
Interlachen held a statute invalid which provided for the valuation
of unsold platted lands on the same basis as unplatted acreage, at
least until sixty percent of the lands were sold. "2 The supreme court
in Williams distinguished Interlachen by stating that Interlachen
was limited to the proposition that the legislature is precluded from
classifying property for taxation purposes at less than just valuation
unless excepted by article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitu-
tion.' The court added that an application of the relevant Florida
enabling statutes' necessitated the result that "leasehold interests
defined therein shall be taxed at a just valuation like all other
property in the state.' 75
Although the court's conclusion that leasehold interests should
be taxed as real estate is sound, the court's reasoning is question-
able. The court stated that to accept the lessee's contention that the
legislature lacked the power to classify leaseholds as real property
would result in the taxation of such interests on the lower intangible
personal property ad valorem scale. The court continued that this
would have the effect of depriving political subdivisions from raising
revenue from such sources in order to defray the costs of the services
supplied to the users thereof."' The court's argument, however,
seems predicated on the notion that taxes are a fee paid for services
rendered. This premise disregards the true nature of taxation. In
reality, taxes are imposed upon an individual whether or not he uses
particular public services or indirectly benefits therefrom. For ex-
ample, the fact that certain residents never use the public school
system, which is responsible for a substantial part of their property
tax burden, does not lower their tax liability. Conversely, a resident
169. Id. at 429.
170. 304 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1973).
171. 326 So. 2d at 431.
172. 304 So. 2d at 435. See the analysis of Interlachen in Williams, 326 So. 2d at 431.
Interlachen considered the validity of the Rose law, FLA. STAT. § 195.062 (1973).
173. 326 So. 2d at 431.
174. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.001(2), .199 (1975).
175. 326 So. 2d at 431.
176. Id. Examples of such services listed by the court include education, and fire and
police protection.
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who uses a vast amount of public services is not liable for propor-
tionately greater taxes or necessarily any at all. For instance, if such
a resident is either a nontaxpayer, because of economic circumstan-
ces, or a tax-exempt entity,'77 there is no legal responsibility for
payment of taxes, regardless of the use of public services.
The Williams court in disagreeing with the intangible rate ar-
gument 7 ' added that the revenues derived from an intangible per-
sonal property tax constitutionally must be paid into the treasury
of the state rather than that of the local political subdivision.179 This
requirement implies that the State of Florida would receive the
benefit for the leaseholds' presence in the form of taxation, while the
county would bear only the lessee's burden, that of consumption of
public services.
The supreme court in Williams concluded that "[t]he legisla-
ture clearly has the power to classify [property] so that all property
devoted to private use is treated on a parity and, therefore, there is
an equitable distribution of the tax burden."'8 0 The court gave no
indication of the source of this classification power. The existence
of such a power implies that the legislature has the discretion of
changing intangible personalty to tangible realty whenever it feels
the conditions merit such a change. The court gave no evidence,
however, that the incidence of the state collecting taxes on lease-
holds would be either significant or inherently harmful to Volusia
County or other particular counties. Even if such harm were pres-
ent, the answer might be to have the state redistribute revenue
collected through this intangible personal property tax. Such reve-
nue sharing could be related to either the county's share of the
intangible property or its burden due to the intangibles. Such reve-
nue sharing could be similar to payments made by the federal gov-
ernment to the District of Columbia in exchange for the large
amount of United States government property in that city which is
immune from taxation.
177. In Florida property used for charitable, literary, religious, or scientific purposes is
exempt from property taxation. The criteria for these exemptions appear in Florida Statutes
section 196.196 (1975).
178. In fact the Williams court went on to say that to tax the leaseholds as intangible
personal property would be to establish an exemption to ad valorem real estate taxation where
none existed. The court added that such an exemption would violate the equal protection
provisions of the Florida and United States Constitutions.
179. Id. at 431-32. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 9.
180. 326 So. 2d at 432.
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The real rationale for defining the property in controversy as
realty was mentioned only briefly by the court. Stated simply, pre-
vious case law has held that a leasehold is a separate and distinct
interest, and therefore, amenable to taxation as real estate. 8' The
reasoning for this view is consistent with the present general rule
that a lease is considered to have created an estate in the land.,8 2
After deciding that the leaseholds were taxable as real property,
the court in Williams still had to determine the measure of taxation.
The court considered whether ninety-nine year leases should be
assessed according to the economic value'83 of the lease or by the fair
market value of the fee simple.8 4 Florida Statutes section 196.199(6)
(1975)1 states that property leased for ninety-nine years or more is
deemed "owned" for purposes of taxation of leasehold interests. The
court held that this statute controlled and that since a lease for
ninety-nine years or more is "tantamount to ownership of the fee,''18
the legislature's classification standard was reasonable.8 7
D. Enforcement
1. NOTICE
The State of Florida, through its agents, sells tax certificates
on property belonging to those who have not paid their taxes.8 8 The
amount required to redeem the tax certificate is the total of all the
costs of the applicant for the tax deed.8 9 This amount constitutes
181. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Walden, 210 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1968).
182. See 2 R. BOYER, FLORIDA RE L ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 35.01 (1976).
At common law the tenant was not regarded as having an interest in land. By 1500,
however, the lessee was recognized clearly as having an interest in the land, and the lease
itself was regarded essentially as a conveyance. Id.
183. Generally, leases are valued as to economic value, which normally involves capital-
izing the value of the property over the term of the lease.
184. 326 So. 2d at 436.
185. This section has been renumbered as Florida Statutes section 196.199(7) (Supp.
1976).
186. 326 So. 2d at 436.
187. The court also noted that the classification contested in Williams is similar to the
homestead exemption provision, FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6. 326 So. at 436.
188. "The holder of any tax certificate . . . may at any time after 2 years have elapsed
since April 1 of the year of issuance of the tax sale certificate . . . file the certificate and an
application for a tax deed with the tax collector .... " FLA. STAT. § 197.241(1) (Supp. 1976).
Furthermore, the holder "shall pay the [tax] collector all amounts required for redemption
or purchase of all outstanding tax certificates, plus interest, any omitted taxes, plus interest,
and delinquent taxes, plus interest, covering the land." FLA. STAT. § 197.241(2) (Supp. 1976).
189. These costs include the fees paid by the holder to the circuit court, the costs of the
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the statutory bid for the purchase of the property by the certificate
holder. 90 The property is put up for auction with the clerk of the
court responsible for notice to the owners prior to the sale as well
as advertisement and administration of the sale.'9 '
Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Reed"2 involved the issue of the suffi-
ciency and due process of notice in tax deed cases. Mid-State
Homes sued to set aside a tax deed, contending it was the legal
titleholder of record for the property in question since the court clerk
had failed to give it notice prior to the sale of its property at a tax
deed sale. The plaintiff had acquired title to the property in August
of 1972 via a certificate of title, which did not bear its address.9 3
Slightly more than one year later the clerk of the circuit court pub-
lished and mailed a notice of application for a tax deed to the owner
of the property as listed on the tax roll when the property was last
assessed. 94
The District Court of Appeal, First District, cited to its pre-
vious decision in Bailey v. Folks"5 and held that the clerk of the
court had fulfilled his duty under the applicable statute' 9 when he
mailed the notice to the person who had been assessed last as the
sale, redemption of other tax certificates on the same land, plus interest at the rate of eight
percent per annum for one month.
190. FLA. STAT. § 197.520 (1971)(current version at FLA. STAT. § 197.266 (1975)).
191. FLA. STAT. § 197.241(2) (Supp. 1976).
If the property is purchased by one other than the certificate holder, the holder shall be
paid back the sums he has paid, including the amount required for redeeming the tax certifi-
cate, all subsequent unpaid taxes, plus costs and expenses of the application for deed with
interest for one month at the rate of eight percent per year. FLA. STAT. § 197.535(1) (1971)(cur-
rent version at FLA. STAT. § 197.291 (1975)).
Any amounts received in excess of the statutory bid of the certificate holder as provided
in Florida Statutes section 197.520 (1973) shall be paid as specified by this statute in a
priority order of other tax liens and special assessments liens with any balance thereafter
being paid to the owner. FLA. STAT. § 197.535(2) (1973).
192. 332 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
193. This certiticate of title was prepared by the plaintiff's attorney.
194. This procedure is in accordance with the Florida statute on mailing notice to the
owner where the application is made by the holder of a tax certificate. FLA. STAT.§ 197.256(1)
(1975). The statute provides that:
[Tihe clerk of the circuit court shall notify, be certified mail with return receipt
requested, the legal titleholder. ...
[I]f the address of the owner appears on the record of the conveyance of the lands
to the owner, or, if the address of the owner does not appear thereon, then the
notice shall be mailed . . . to the owner to whom the property was assessed on
the tax roll for the year in which the property was last assessed . ...
195. 182 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
196. FLA. STAT. § 197.256(1) (1975).
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owner of the property. The court stated that the only issue presented
by Mid-State Homes was whether the clerk of the circuit court
failed to give it notice as the legal titleholder of record, prior to
selling the property at a tax deed sale. Apparently, the appellant did
not raise any issue concerning the due process constitutionality of
the statute itself by alleging insufficiency of notice.
In Bailey, the First District denied a plaintiff's contention that
the owner of property was entitled to notice if his name appeared
either on "the last extended tax roll, or . . .in the most recent tax
collector's receipt book."' 97 The court held that since the tax roll
showed entries under "name of owner and address" for the proper-
ties, it was unnecessary for the court to look to the receipt book,"
even though the entries for the owner did not refer to the plaintiff,
who was the actual owner of the property. In Mid-State Homes
there was no address on the tax roll for the plaintiff, yet the clerk
took the extra step of sending notice to the one to whom the property
last was assessed.'99 Clearly, the clerk's actions in Mid-State Homes
met the standard of diligence imposed by Bailey, and the First
District held accordingly.
Another case involving the due process notice issue, Stubbs v.
Cummings,00 also was decided in favor of the state. There, the
District Court of Appeal, First District, considered an executrix's
appeal concerning the procedures by which a tax deed had been
issued on her aunt's property. The aunt had inherited the property
in 1958 and paid the taxes on it until 1968. During this time the
original owner's name was retained on the tax statements and tax
rolls. In 1968, the aunt was declared legally incompetent, but no
guardian was appointed for her person or property. After the aunt's
death in May 1972, but before an executrix was appointed for her
estate, a tax deed was issued on her property.
The executrix filed suit against the holders of the tax deed to
have the deed set aside, contending that the procedures followed in
the issuance of the tax deed were insufficient to divest lawful owner-
ship of the property from an incompetent, and that the procedures
followed constituted a taking of property without due process of law
197. 182 So. 2d at 478.
198. Id. at 479.
199. The clerk of the circuit court also published a notice of application for a tax deed,
presumably as provided under Florida Statutes section 197.246 (1975).
200. 336 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. The execu-
trix's contention was not founded on a failure by the county to follow
the procedures prescribed by the Florida statutes."0 ' Rather, the
plaintiff argued that there was an absence of the due process stan-
dards set out by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Covey v. Town of Somers. 02 Covey involved the foreclosure of real
property due to nonpayment of taxes. The Supreme Court held that
"[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to . . . afford . . .
[interested parties] an opportunity to present their objections. '"2 03
Covey added that "[t]he means employed [to achieve notice]
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."204
As in Stubbs v. Cummings, the owner of the property subject
to the tax deed in Covey was mentally incompetent. The First Dis-
trict distinguished the Covey case by noting that the key fact in
Covey was that the town officials were aware that the owner was
mentally incompetent, 0 ' while in Stubbs the officials in question
had no actual knowledge of the aunt's incompetency "or even of her
ownership of the property. '206
The executrix in Stubbs, alleged also that there was construc-
tive notice of the aunt's incompetency because it became a matter
of public record when she was declared incompetent by a judicial
officer in the county in which the property was located. The First
District presaged its answer to the allegations of the executrix when
it phrased the constructive service issue as whether any county offi-
cial charged with giving notice "of procedures which lead to [the]
loss of land for nonpayment of taxes has the duty to search all public
records available to him to ascertain the actual status of ownership
201. FLA. STAT. § 197.505 (1971) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 197.256 (1975)). This
section contains the relevant notice provisions for application for tax deeds.
202. 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
203. Id. at 146 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950)).
204. Id. at 146 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
315 (1950)).
205. In Covey a committee was not appointed to act as guardian until after a default
had been entered in the foreclosure proceedings. The committee's motion to open the default
was denied.
206. 336 So. 2d at 415.
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of the property and the incompetency of . . . [a] party."20 7 The
court found that the atatute has no such requirement.20 1 The First
District stated that it is the function of the legislature to prescribe
a system which imposes and collects taxes, and that the ultimate
resort for the collection of these taxes is to the land itself. The court
held that the legislature has not seen fit to adopt a procedure requir-
ing county officials "to ascertain the status of owners of property by
a search of all public records which might reveal same, but rather
[has chosen to] rely upon the tax rolls or tax collector receipt books
or other information that is directly furnished them by interested
parties. '209 Quoting a previous case210 involving the effect of disabili-
ties, the court held that the "courts have no authority to alleviate
harshness of taxing acts where such relief is not provided for in the
statutes of the states."121'
Finally, the Stubbs court found that there was no failure of due
process: "[A]ctual receipt of notice is not required, but strict ad-
herence to statutory requirements is essential. The notices required
are those deemed by the legislature to be most apt to accomplish
the purpose of actual service and meaningful appraisal of pending
procedures. 2 12 The court stated that such statutes are analogous to
the concept of constructive notice by publication which may be
utilized in matters pertaining to real property. Although the court
dealt thoroughly with the notice required by the state statute, it did
not analyze precisely the constitutional due process issue. The court
indicated that only strict adherence to statutory requirements is
essential. The court should have considered, however, whether the
statute itself provided sufficient due process notice. A thorough ex-
amination of this statute by the court in light of the constitutional
due process standards required by Covey might have altered the
decision.
207. Id.
208. Id. FLA. STAT. § 197.505(1) (1971) .(current version at FLA. STAT. § 197.256 (1975)).
The statute requires only the mailing of notice to the owner when an application had been
made for a tax deed. The copy of the notice is mailed to the owner if his name and address
appear on the tax roll for the year in which taxes were last extended on the property. If the
name and address do not appear thereon, notice shall be mailed to the person last paying
taxes according to the tax collector's receipt book. "The failure of the owner . ..to receive
the notice shall not affect the validity of the tax deed issued pursuant to the notice." Id.
209. 336 So. 2d at 415.
210. Fleming v. Hillsborough County, 107 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
211. 336 So. 2d at 416 (quoting Fleming v. Hillsborough County, 107 So. 2d 162, 166 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1958)).
212. 336 So. 2d at 416.
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2. ATTACHMENT
In Williams v. Jones,"' the Supreme Court of Florida upheld
the validity of Florida Statutes section 196.199(7) (1975), which
provides for the attachment of a lessee's own property to satisfy real
property taxes on his leasehold. The court pointed out that the
section allows attachment of the lessee's property to satisfy a les-
see's tax indebtedness, because the lessee has no fee simple title to
the land which can be attached directly."' The supreme court stated
that designation of the manner in which taxes are to be collected is
a matter within the legislature's discretion, and that the method
selected by the legislature will not be disturbed absent a constitu-
tional defect. The Williams court found that the collection proce-
dures in effect in the case were consistent with the nature of the
property taxed, stating that it is within the state's power to have
different classes or kinds of property responsible for taxes assessed
and levied against other classes and kinds of property." 5 The court
added that any property a taxpayer owns may be subject to the
collection of taxes if the taxpayer has been levied against. The court
found that this principle was consistent with statutory collection
procedures for intangible personal property taxes."'
II. CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
A tax measured by net income is imposed by the Florida In-
come Tax Code on all corporations for the privilege of conducting
business, earning or receiving income, or being a resident or citizen
of the state."7 Net income is defined as adjusted federal income, as
apportioned under Florida Statutes section 220.15, less any exemp-
tions under section 220.14.11 The Code also provides that certain
income derived from sources outside the United States may be sub-
tracted from this amount under certain conditions." The District
213. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975).
214. Normally a lessor's title would be attached regardless of the liability of the lessee
to the lessor for payment of taxes. However, in this instance the plaintiffs were lessees of
publicly owned property on Santa Rosa Island in Escambia County.
215. 326 So. 2d at 436.
216. FLA. STAT. § 199.262 (1975).
217. FLA. STAT. § 220.11(1) (1975).
218. FLA. STAT. § 220.12 (1975).
219. FLA. STAT. § 220.13(1)(b) 2.b., c. (1975). Section 220.13(1)(b) provides in pertinent
part:
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Court of Appeal, Third District, had an opportunity to interpret this
last section in Heftier Construction Co. & Subsidiary v. Department
of Revenue.2 0 A New Jersey corporation which was doing business
in Florida had two subsidiaries doing business in Puerto Rico. The
losses incurred by these subsidiaries were included by Heftler Con-
struction Company, not only in its tax return to the Internal Reve-
nue Service, but also in its return to the Florida Department of
Revenue. The corporation also included the property, payroll and
sales of the Puerto Rican firms in its apportionment formula.",
The Department of Revenue, in an order approved by the
governor and cabinet sitting as the head of the Department of Reve-
nue, refused to allow the inclusion of any figures derived from opera-
tions in Puerto Rico. The Department concluded that the term
"United States" in section 220.13(1)(b)2b 2 should be defined so as
not to include Puerto Rico. The Department relied on an adminis-
trative ruling which provided that "income derived from sources
within a possession or territory of the United States shall be treated
as income derived from sources outside the United States. 2 23
The term "everywhere" as used in section 214.71(3)224 is defined
by section 220.15(3)25 to mean "in all states of the United States,
2. There shall be subtracted from such taxable income any amount included
therein:
b. Which was derived from sales outside the United States, and from
sources outside the United States as interest, as a royalty, or as com-
pensation for technical or other services; and
c. Which was received as a dividend from a corporation which nei-
ther transacts any substantial portion of its business in the United
States nor regularly maintains any substantial portion of its assets
within the United States.
However, as to any amount subtracted under this subparagraph, there
shall be added to such taxable income all expenses deducted on the
taxpayer's return for the taxable year which are attributable, directly
or indirectly, to such subtracted amount.
220. 334 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
221. Florida Statutes section 220.15 (1975) provides that adjusted federal income shall
be apportioned to the state in accordance with part IV of chapter 214. The apportionment
formulas are set out in Florida Statutes section 214.71 (1975). Under subsection (3) of that
section, "[the sales factor is a fraction the numerator of which is the total sales of the
taxpayer in this state during the taxable year or period and the denominator of which is the
total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the taxable year or period." FLA. STAT. §
214.71(3) (1975) (emphasis added).
222. FLA. STAT. § 220.13(1)(b)2b (1975).
223. FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 12C-1.13(1)(b)2 (1974).
224. FLA. STAT. § 214.71(3) (1975).
225. FLA. STAT. § 220.15(3) (1975).
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the District of Columbia, or any political subdivision of the
foregoing." ' The Department compared this wording with that of
the original wording,"' which defined "everywhere" to mean "in all
other states of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision of the foregoing." ' 8 The
Department concluded that the subsequent deletion of the reference
to Puerto Rico evidenced a legislative intent to not include income
derived therefrom. In concurring, the Third District disallowed the
inclusion of income or losses derived from Puerto Rico.
III. ESTATE TAXES
Florida Statutes section 198.02 (1975) provides for the payment
of a tax upon the estates of allresident decedents."' The Supreme
court of Florida recently construed this statute in Department of
Revenue v. Golder.23 In Golder, the decedent owned property in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey at the time of his death, although the
bulk of his estate was in Florida. The total inheritance taxes paid
in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, when added to the estate tax paid
in Florida, exceeded the total federal credit allowable by section
206.43. The decedent's executrix requested a refund of that amount
from the Department of Revenue pursuant to section 198.29.31 The
request was denied.
The question before the court was whether section 198.02 as
226. Id.
227. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-984 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 220.14(3) (1975)).
228. Id.
229. This section provides:
A tax is imposed upon the transfer of the estate of every person who, at the
time of death, was a resident of this state, the amount of which shall be a sum
equal to the amount by which the credit allowable under the applicable Federal
Revenue Act for estate, inheritance, legacy and succession taxes actually paid to
the several states shall exceed the lesser of:
(1) The aggregate amount of all constitutionally valid estate, inheritance,
legacy and succession taxes acually paid to the several states of the United States
(other than this state) in respect of any property owned by such decedent or
subject to such taxes as a part of or in connection with his estate, or:
(2) An amount equal to such proportion of such allowable credit as the
value of properties taxable by other states bears to the value of the entire gross
estate wherever situate. All values shall be as finally determined for federal estate
tax purposes.
230. 326 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1976).
231. FLA. STAT. § 198.29 (1975).
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applied violated the Florida Constitution. 32 When the circuit court
held that it did, the Department of Revenue appealed directly to the
supreme court. 33 The supreme court had dealt with the same issue
in Green v. State ex rel. Phipps.234 In Green the court ruled that
neither the constitution nor the statute authorized the collection of
estate taxes in excess of the federal credit allowed. 35
The Golder court decided that Green was precedent. Since
section 198.02236 as applied to the Golder facts increased the tax
burden on the decedent's estate beyond the constitutional limita-
tions, the statute was held to have produced an unconstitutional
result. The court did not find it necessary to rule on the constitu-
tionality of the statute itself.2 37
IV. SALES AND USE TAXES
A. Extent of Power
Florida Statutes chapter 212 (1975) prescribes sales and use
taxes. Section 212.065(5),23s as does the United States Constitu-
tion, 3 ' excepts all imports and exports from the application of these
taxes. That section was construed recently by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Fred McGilvray, Inc. v. Askew. 40
In McGilvray a subcontractor supplied, fabricated, and in-
stalled materials for his prime contractor in connection with a con-
struction project in the Bahamas. The contract was a cost plus fee
contract. The subcontractor purchased materials from vendors both
within and without the state. The goods were delivered to
232. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a). Section 5(a) provides that:
[nio tax upon estates or inheritances or upon the income of natural persons who
are residents or citizens of the state shall be levied by the state, or under its
authority, in excess of the aggregate of amounts which may be allowed to be
credited upon or deducted from any similar tax levied by the United States or
any state.
233. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
234. 166 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1964).
235. Although Florida has changed its constitution since Green was decided, the sub-
stance of the prior prohibition of estate taxes in excess of the federal credit has carried forward
unchanged. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
236. FLA. STAT. § 198.02 (1975).
237. 326 So. 2d at 411.
238. FLA. STAT. § 212.06(5) (1975).
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. The Constitution exempts imports and exports from
taxation except "what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspections laws."
240. 340 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1976).
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Transworld Marine in Miami and later loaded onto barges chartered
by the prime contractor. No bills of lading or export declarations
accompanied the goods. The barges transporting the goods were not
common carriers. Florida levied a sales and use tax on the goods,
and the subcontractor contested that action.
The court perceived the issue to be whether the goods were
exports within the meaning of the "import-export clause" 4' of the
United States Constitution and thus immune from taxation. The
court looked to the tests provided under Florida law242 to help deter-
mine whether the goods were exports. Goods are deemed to be ex-
ports when they have entered the export stream. Entrance occurs
when they are delivered to the first common carrier with an ultimate
destination outside the state, or to a licensed exporter for export-
ing.243
The subcontractor never contended that the statutory condi-
tions were met; it argued that the financial and contractual arrange-
ments which it had with the prime contractor showed a commit-
ment to export the goods. The subcontractor relied on State ex rel.
Sunair Electronics, Inc. v. Green,"' in which the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that placing equipment aboard the pur-
chaser's aircraft committed the property to the export stream and
passed title to the purchaser as effectively as placing the equipment
on a common carrier. 45 The McGilvray court distinguished Sunair
Electronics because the goods were placed directly on the aircraft
and were not, as in McGilvray, stored in a warehouse prior to ship-
ment.2
6
The court then turned for support to three decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. 47 Each decision addressed the issue
241. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 2.
242. FLA. STAT. § 212.06(5) (1975). This section provides in relevant part:
(a) It is not the intention of this chapter to levy a tax upon tangible personal
property imported, produced or manufactured in this state for export, provided
that tangible personal property shall not be considered as being imported, pro-
duced or manufactured for export unless the importer, producer or manufacturer
delivers the same to a licensed exporter for exporting, or to a common carrier for
shipment outside the state or mails the same by United States mail to a destina-
tion outside the state . ...
243. Id.
244. 177 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. discharged, 180 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1965).
245. Id. at 495.
246. 340 So. 2d at 477.
247. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974); Empresa Siderurgica,
S.A. v. Merced County, 337 U.S. 154 (1949); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886). Though the
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of when goods are considered to have entered the export stream. In
the most recent case, Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 4" an
Ohio ad valorem personal property tax was upheld by the Court.
The Kosydar decision was reached because the machines upon
which the tax was imposed had been stored in a warehouse for three
years and there was no certainty that they would be exported. As
the Court noted in Empresa Siderurgica S.A. v. Merced County:24
[I]t is not enough that there is an intent to export, or a plan
which contemplates exportation, or an integrated series of events
which will end with it . . . .It is the entrance of the articles into
the export stream that marks the start of the process of exporta-
tion. Then there is certainty that the goods are headed for their
foreign destination and will not be diverted to domestic use.
Nothing less will suffice.25
Deciding that the goods had not yet entered the export stream,
the McGilvray court upheld the imposition of the tax.
Both parties and the court appear to have overlooked one key
fact. Some of the goods were purchased outside the state. At least
with respect to those goods, the issue should not have been whether
they had entered the export stream; it should have been whether
they had ever left the stream of commerce, i.e., the interstate and
foreign stream of commerce.
This aspect of McGilvray should be controlled by Minnesota v.
Blasius.25' There, cattle were shipped from outside the state to
stockyards in St. Paul, Minnesota. Blasius purchased the cattle in
St. Paul for resale out of state. He later sold the cattle to nonresi-
dents, and the cattle were shipped out of state. Since Blasius owned
the cattle and held them in the state on the tax day, he was assessed
taxes for them. The United States Supreme Court upheld the impo-
sition of the taxes because "the original shipment was not sus-
pended; it was ended. That shipment was to the South St. Paul
stockyards for sale on that market. That transportation had ceased,
and the cattle were sold. . . to Blasius, who became absolute owner
tax under consideration in each case is an ad valorem property tax, unlike the sales and use
tax being tested here, the principles involved are the same. Fred McGilvray, Inc. v. Askew,
340 So. 2d at 478.
248. 417 U.S. 62 (1974).
249. 337 U.S. 154 (1949).
250. Id. at 156-57.
251. 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
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and was free to deal with them as he liked." '252 The Court would have
invalidated the tax if the original shipment had been merely tempo-
rarily interrupted.253
The subcontractor in McGilvray did not purchase the goods in
Miami and look around for a buyer. The goods were purchased
outside the state with a buyer in mind. They were shipped to Miami
in order to be loaded on the barges chartered by the contractor. In
Blasius "itihe cattle were not held . . . for the purpose of promot-
ing their safe or convenient transit. They were not in transit. Their
situs was in Minnesota where they had come to rest." '254 Therefore,
the tax was upheld. On the other hand, the goods in McGilvray were
delayed because they were being switched from one carrier to an-
other. Under Blasius, therefore, the shipment merely was sus-
pended, it had not ended.
The point at which the protection of the constitution begins is
when the goods "commence their final movement for transportation
from the State of their origin to that of their destination." '255 Since
the subcontrator was purchasing the goods for the prime contractor
in connection with the construction project in the Bahamas, it is
clear that the goods were intended for the Bahamas as soon as they
left the out-of-state vendors. That the prime contractor purchased
the goods from the subcontractor in Miami is misleading. Since it
was a cost plus fee type of contract, the parties had already agreed
that the subcontractor would first buy the goods in its own name,
and get "reimbursed" for its cost plus earn a fee. But even if it were
a separate sale, the Supreme Court has suggested256 that whenever
the interruption in transit is related to the necessities of the journey,
as it arguably was in McGilvray, the constitutional protections still
prevent the imposition of the tax.257
252. Id. at 12.
253. Id. at 9-10.
254. Id. at 12.
255. Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 525 (1886).
256. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95
(1929); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
257. Note that Blasius and Coe are decisions made under the interstate commerce
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, not under the import-export clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 2. It has been suggested that though the tax may not be repugnant to the import-
export clause, its imposition should be restrained as a burden on interstate and foreign
commerce, to the extent that it is imposed with respect to goods the subcontractor purchased
from outside the state.
In Coe the Court distinguished the situation before it from the case where goods which
are already in transit are delayed en route to another state. "Such goods are already in the
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Though the subcontractor and the prime contractor may have
been aware that the ultimate destination of the goods was the Baha-
mas, absent any bills of lading and export declarations to that ef-
fect, it is understandable that the Department of Revenue was in-
clined to think otherwise. Nevertheless, since those documents are
only referred to as evidence of an intent to export goods, the subcon-
tractor should have been given an opportunity to provide evidence
of like weight, though of a different nature.25 If the nature of the
contract, or of the construction project, or of the relationship of the
parties would indicate that the goods were destined for the Baha-
mas, such evidence should be used to prevent the imposition of this
tax.
The supreme court responded to this argument with an excerpt
from Sumitomo Forestry Co. v. Thurston County:5 ' "[c]ertainty of
export evidenced by financial and contractual relationships does
not by itself render goods 'exports' before their [sic] commence-
ment of their journey abroad.""26 Sumitomo is distinguishable from
McGilvray because it does not involve goods which were already in
transit prior to "resting." A more analagous case is Carson Petro-
leum Co. v. Vial.26' There, oil was shipped by railroad from out of
state to Louisiana, where it was stored in tanks prior to being loaded
on ships bound for foreign ports. The United States Supreme Court
held that the storage of the oil in the tanks did not break the stream
of commerce."' Thus, the tax was invalidated.
The language of Carson indicates the Court would not have
been concerned with the lack of bills of lading and export declara-
tions here. Whether goods are exports must depend on "all the
evidential circumstances," 3 not the presence or absence of particu-
lars. The Supreme Court of Florida should have looked beyond the
absence of bills of lading and export declarations. The court should
course of commercial transportation, and are clearly under the protection of the
Constitution." 116 U.S. at 525.
258. See Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929); Hughes Bros. Co. v. Minne-
sota, 272 U.S. 469, 473 (1926); Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346, 349 (1917).
259. 504 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975).
260. 340 So. 2d at 578 (quoting Sumitomo Forestry Co. v. Thurston County, 504 F.2d
604, 608 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. Merced County, 377 U.S. 154,
156-57 (1949)).
261. 279 U.S. 95 (1929).
262. Id. at 109.
263. Id. at 103 (quoting Hughes Bros. Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 476 (1926)).
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have looked at the financial and contractual relationship of the
parties.
As in Carson, the tax levied in McGilvray, at least with respect
to those goods shipped from out of state, should have been invalida-
ted. Minnesota v. Blasius"5 4 and Carson involve facts and principles
too analagous to those in McGilvray to warrant the decision that
was made.
B. Exemptions
1. THE STATE
The City of Tallahassee imposed a utility tax through an ordi-
nance establishing a ten percent tax on all purchases of electricity,
water, and gas within the city limits. 65 The city sought to act pur-
suant to article VII, section 9(a) of the Florida Constitution"' and
the municipal finance and taxation section of the Municipal Home
Rule Powers Act.6 7 The ordinance adopted by the city specifically
exempted from the utility tax purchases made by either the federal
government or churches. The ordinance, however, did not provide
a like exemption for the state.
Under the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, a municipality
''may exempt" from taxation purchases made by the United States
government and the state government."6 Additionally, it "shall ex-
empt purchases by any recognized church."2 9 The State of Florida
challenged the constitutionality of this enabling statute, contending
that neither the constitutional nor statutory foundation for the tax
expressly waived the state's inherent sovereign immunity from taxa-
tion. The city responded that the 1968 Constitution, in conferring
municipal taxing authority, did not reserve the right of sovereign
immunity.
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the state's "freedom
from taxation derives from an 'immunity,' not from an
264. 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
265. Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
266. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(a). This section provides in relevant part that municipali-
ties "may be authorized by general law to levy other [than ad valorem] taxes . . . except
. . . taxes prohibited by this constitution."
267. FLA. STAT. § 166.231 (1973). This statute gives municipalities the power to levy a
tax on purchases of electricity, gas, water service, telephone service, telegraph service, and
cable television.
268. FLA. STAT. § 166.231(4) (1973).
269. Id. This exemption only applies to purchases used exclusively for church purposes.
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'exemption.' "270 Furthermore, the courtheld that the state did not
waive its immunity either in the 1968 Constitution or in the ena-
bling statute. The supreme court indicated that it seemed unlikely
that the state would indirectly authorize an indeterminate amount
of revenue to be taken from it for the benefit of municipalities. The
court added that the logical approach would be to require a clear
and direct expression of the state's intention to subject itself to local
taxation. Since the supreme court did not find such an expression,
it held that the state's immunity from taxation was intact.
2. PRIVATE UTILITIES
Department of Revenue v. Merritt Square Corp.2"' involved a
shopping center owner, which contended that it was a private util-
ity, therefore exempt from having to pay sales tax on its purchases
of natural gas. Florida Statutes section 212.08(4) (1975) provides
that all fuels used by public or private utilities shall be exempt from
sales taxation.272 The taxpayer operated an energy plant on its prop-
erty which generated electricity. Sixty percent of its generated
power was metered separately and sold to tenants in the shopping
center for use in their respective businesses. The residual electricity
was used by the shopping center to provide for the common areas
of the complex.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the
taxpayer was entitled to an exemption from the sales tax on that
portion of the electricity sold to the tenants. The court added, how-
ever, that the gas purchased for use in the common areas was "not
used in 'generation of electric power or energy for sale.' "273 Addi-
tionally, the First District noted that where the electricity is paid
for by the tenant in the form of rent,"4 it is impossible to segregate
the portion of the rent attributable to this purchase.
The First District's reason for affirming the sixty percent ex-
emption rested on its determination that the taxpayer was a private
270. Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1975).
271. 334 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
272. Also included within the statute are "municipal corporations and rural electric
cooperative associations in the generation of electrical power or energy for sale." FLA. STAT.
§ 212.08(4) (1975).
273. 334 So. 2d at 353 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 212.08(4) (1975)).
274. The tenants each were charged a maintenance fee on a square foot basis for general
maintenance and utility services to the common areas of the shopping center.
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utility. Under the exemption statute275 both public and private utili-
ties are exempt from sales taxation. Since the legislature defined
"public utility" to include any entity supplying electricity or gas to
the public, the court theorized that the phrase had a distinct mean-
ing. The court defined private utility as an entity selling energy to
a limited group. Accordingly, the First District held that Merritt
Square was a private utility with respect to its sales of electricity
to its tenants and was entitled to an exemption from the sales tax
on its purchases of natural gas for resale.
V. DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES
A. Scope
Florida Statutes section 201.02 (1975)275 imposes a tax through
the sale of stamps which must be affixed to documents for certain
kinds of transactions. The tax is paid by the purchaser and is mea-
sured as a percentage of the consideration paid. The Supreme Court
of Florida recently construed this statute in Florida Department of
Revenue v. De Maria.277
De Maria was the president and sole stockholder of Orange
Motors of Miami. The corporation acquired real property for $85,000
including a purchase money mortage of $60,000. The property later
was conveyed by the corporation to De Maria in a quitclaim deed.
Although not assuming the mortgage, De Maria made the payments
for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage. The Department of Reve-
nue imposed a documentary tax under section 201.02278 and a pen-
275. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(4) (1975).
276. Section 201.02 provides:
(1) On deeds, instruments or writings whereby any lands, tenements, or other
realty, or any interest therein, shall be granted, assigned, transferred, or otherwise
conveyed to, or vested in, the purchaser, or any other person by his direction, on
each one hundred dollars of the consideration therefore the tax shall be thirty
cents. When the full amount of the consideration for the execution, assignment,
transfer, or conveyance is not shown in the face of such deed, instrument, docu-
ment, or writing, the tax shall be at the rate of thirty cents for each one hundred
dollars or fractional part thereof of the consideration therefor.
(2) The tax imposed by subsection (1) of this section shall also be payable upon
documents by which the right is granted to a tenant-stockholder to occupy an
apartment in a building owned by a cooperative apartment corporation.
(3) The tax imposed by subsection (2) shall be paid by the purchaser, and the
document recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court as evidence of
ownership.
277. 338 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1976).
278. FLA. STAT. § 201.02 (1975).
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alty under section 201.17.279 De Maria brought an action to prevent
imposition of the tax. The circuit court and later the District Court
of Appeal, First District,28° ruled that he did not have to pay the tax
because the transfer was a mere "book transaction" as in State ex
rel. Palmer-Florida Corp. v. Green.2"'
Judge Smith of the First District dissented on the grounds that
the transaction was an attempt to shift the burden of paying the
mortgage note from the corporation to the plaintiff and as such,
amounted to a taxable consideration for the conveyance.282 He
argued that the supreme court's decision in Kendall-House Apart-
ments, Inc. v. Department of Revenue283 should be controlling and
that the court should look to the financial realities of a situation
when a corporation deeds property to a stockholder. Thus, he rea-
soned that the taxpayer's payment of the mortgage obligation evi-
denced the financial reality that the taxpayer had assumed the
mortgage. 284
The First District had an opportunity to reexamine its De
Maria holding in Straughn v. Story.2 5 In Story a corporation owned
279. FLA. STAT. § 201.17 (1975).
280. Department of Revenue v. De Maria, 321 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975), rev'd, 338
So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1976).
281. 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1956). In Green a corporation conveyed an interest in real
property to its stockholders in amounts proportionate to their holdings in the corporation.
The property was unencumbered. The value of the real estate was charged to the paid-in
surplus account of the corporation. Documentary stamps were affixed to the deed, but it was
later contended that the tax was erroneously paid. The court held that the deed did not
require the stamps because the stockholders were not purchasers and did not pay a
"reasonably determinable" consideration within the meaning of section 201.02. It was held
to be a mere book transaction and not the kind of sale to a purchaser contemplated by the
statute.
282. 321 So. 2d at 102.
283. 245 So. 2d 221 (Fla.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971). Kendall House Apartments
sold real estate to a grantee and agreed to pay all the documentary taxes. The property was
sold subject to a mortgage, but the grantor agreed to continue making the payments only until
the date of closing, Kendall-House Apartments affixed stamps to the deed so that taxes were
paid on the purchase price of the property but not on the outstanding mortgage. The Depart-
ment of Revenue argued that the mortgage must be included as part of the consideration.
The supreme court pointed out that "[iut is an economic fact that persons who acquire
property 'subject to' a mortgage normally pay the indebtedness represented by the mortgage
in order to prevent the loss of the property to the same extent as those persons acquiring
property 'assuming and agreeing to pay' the mortgage." Id. at 223. The court held that the
shifting of the economic burden constituted additional consideration and an additional tax-
able sum. Thus, the tax was upheld.
284. 321 So. 2d at 102.
285. 334 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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real estate encumbered by a recorded mortgage securing a promis-
sory note in the original amount of $1,800,000. The plaintiffs exe-
cuted a guaranty of loan agreement with the corporation as the
borrower. Under the terms of the agreement, if the corporation were
to default, the guarantor would become primarily liable. The agree-
ment also provided that the corporation could not transfer the prop-
erty without the lender's consent, and then only if the transferee
became primarily liable on the note. The corporation then trans-
ferred the property to the guarantor without the payment of any
consideration. The Department of Revenue tried to impose a docu-
mentary stamp tax under section 201.02288 and a penalty under sec-
tion 201.17(2).287
The trial court decided that the plaintiff-guarantor was not a
purchaser within the meaning of section 201.02.8 The First District
affirmed, distinguishing Judge Smith's dissent in De Maria because
there was no shifting of any burden of payment. The court found
that the plaintiff-guarantor did not assume any obligations for
which he already was not completely responsible. As in De Maria,
the court based its decision on State ex rel. Palmer-Florida Corp.
v. Green.'8
Again Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the shift from being
secondarily liable to being primarily liable was sufficient considera-
tion to force the plaintiff to become liable for tax payments.80
Because of an apparent conflict between the First District's
holding in De Maria and the supreme court's holding in Kendall-
House Apartments, the supreme court decided to hear the De Maria
case. The supreme court agreed with the dissent of Judge Smith and
reversed the earlier ruling of the First District, holding that the
shifting of the economic burden was sufficient consideration to
make the taxpayer a purchaser within the meaning of the statute.
State ex rel. Palmer-Florida Corp. v. Green was distinguished be-
cause it dealt with property which was unencumbered.
Though Story has not yet been heard by the supreme court, and
may not be, it would appear that the De Maria ruling ends specula-
tion about the validity of that result. In the future, courts should
286. FLA. STAT. § 201.02 (1975).
287. FLA. STAT. § 201.17(2) (Supp. 1976).
288. FLA. STAT. § 201.02 (1975).
289. 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1956).
290. 334 So. 2d at 339.
[Vol. 31:1231
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
follow the Kendall-House Apartments approach of looking to the
financial reality of the conveyance and not to the form of the trans-
action.
B. Surtax
Florida Statutes section 201.021 (1975)9" levies a surtax on doc-
uments taxed under section 201.02.92 The section, however, ex-
cludes specifically the amounts of existing mortgages from the ap-
plication of the surtax. The section, especially the latter provision,
was construed recently by the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, in Department of Revenue v. Brookwood Associates, Ltd.93
In Brookwood Associates, the purchaser acquired land which
was encumbered by an existing mortgage. The purchaser entered an
agreement with the seller whereby the purchaser would make pay-
ments on the first morgage to the seller at the same time that pay-
ments were made on a second mortgage. The seller, mortgagee to
the purchaser, and mortgagor to the original lender, then would
make payments directly to the original mortgagee." 4
While paying the documentary tax on the entire amount of the
consideration paid, the purchaser excluded the amount of the first
mortgage from the sum on which the surtax was paid. The Depart-
ment of Revenue assessed the purchaser for that additional amount
plus a penalty under section 201.17(2).111 The court refused to up-
291. This section provides:
(1) A documentary surtax, in addition to the tax levied in s. 201.02, is levied
on those documents taxed by s. 201.02 at the rate of fifty-five cents per five
hundred dollars of the consideration paid; provided, that when real estate is sold,
the consideration, for purposes of this tax, shall not include amounts of existing
morgages on the real estate sold. If the full amount of the consideration is not
shown on the face of the document, then the tax shall be at the rate of fifty-five
cents on each five hundred dollars or fractional part thereof of the consideration.
(2) The Department of Revenue shall pay all taxes collected under this
section to the Treasurer for deposit in the Land Acquisition Trust Fund. Sums
deposited there may be used for any purpose for which funds deposited in the
Land Acquisition Trust Fund may lawfully be used and may be used to pay the
cost of the collection and -nforcement of the tax levied by this section.
292. FLA. STAT. § 201.02 (1975).
293. 324 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
294. For a discussion of this kind of arrangement, see Comment, The Wrap-Around
Mortgage: A Critical Inquiry, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1529 (1974).
295. FLA. STAT. § 201.17(2) (1975). This section was amended in 1976 to provide an
additional penalty for failure to pay the required tax: "(C) Payment of interest to the Depart-
ment of Revenue, accruing from the date of recordation until paid at the rate of one percent
per month or fraction thereof, based on the purchase price of the stamps not affixed."
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hold the imposition of the additional tax, commenting that to do so
"would utterly frustrate the glaring legislative intent."29 6
Section 201.021 subsequently was construed by the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Leadership Housing, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue .2 17 The taxpayers there, whose business was
selling improved residential property, had sold nineteen homes to
nineteen different purchasers. Prior to sale, each home wag encum-
bered by a mortgage between the taxpayer and a lender. Each sale
provided that the purchaser would assume the existing mortgage
after making a partial payment to the taxpayer.
Documentary stamp taxes were paid on both the cash amounts
and the amount of the mortgages, but the surtax was paid only on
the cash amounts. The Department of Revenue argued that the
surtax also would have to be paid on the mortgage value. It con-
tended that the original obligation was extinguished and a new
obligation substituted when the mortgages were assumed. 29 1 The
court pointed out that if the original mortgage obligation could be
so easily extinguished, "the lender would be in danger of losing its
priority to any intervening lien filed prior to creation of the 'new
mortgage. '"'29
C. Penalties for Nonpayment
Under Florida Statutes section 201.17(2) (1975) a penalty is
levied for failure to pay the documentary stamp tax. Violators must
purchase the stamps necessary and pay a penalty equal to the value
of the stamps not affixed. The Supreme Court of Florida upheld
that section as constitutional in Dominion Land & Title Corp. v.
Department of Revenue.°09
Dominion was the title insuring agent for Commonwealth Land
& Title Insurance Co. It handled the recordation of a certain war-
ranty deed conveying real property in Dade County. Documentary
296. 324 So. 2d at 186.
297. 336 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
298. The state relied on an administrative ruling of the Department of Revenue, FLA.
ADMIN. CODE § 12A-4.13(25) (1973), which provided that "[wihen computing the surtax
under Section 201.021, F.S., on a deed of conveyance, the total consideration on which such
tax is based includes a mortgage debt which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay when
the original mortgagor (grantor) is released from the obligation by the mortgagee." The state
also relied on an opinion of the Attorney General. [1973] FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 67.
299. 336 So. 2d at 1242.
300. 320 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1975).
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stamps"' and surtax stamps0 2 were due in the respective amounts
of $17,700 and $3,500. Though Dominion received payment covering
the cost of the stamps, it accidentally left off the list the amounts
required for the purchase of the stamps while it was preparing a list
of the fees and tax charges. Nevertheless, the clerk of the circuit
court accepted the deed without the stamps. Shortly thereafter,
Dominion was notified that the necessary stamps were not affixed
to the deed. The deed was thereupon re-recorded. The Department
of Revenue then assessed a penalty under section 201.17(2) in the
amount of $21,230. In response Dominion brought suit in the Circuit
Court for Dade County challenging the constitutionality of section
201.17(2) and alleging that the Department of Revenue should be
estopped from applying that section to it because of the clerk's
error.31 3 After an adverse ruling, Dominion appealed directly to the
Supreme Court of Florida. 304
The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the statute on
the grounds that it was so harsh and unreasonable that it consti-
tuted a denial of due process within the meaning of the Florida"5
and United States Constitutions. 301 It also contended that the pen-
alty was excessive. 307 Dominion submitted two tests for statutes
imposing penalties. These tests were that the statute should be
declared unconstitutional if it imposed either a fine that was so
great as to shock the conscience of reasonable men or a fine bearing
no rational relationship to the wrong. The court ruled the statute
constitutional. It considered the legislature's plenary power in the
area of taxation, the statutes of other states which were held consti-
301. FLA. STAT. § 201.02 (1975).
302. FLA. STAT. § 201.021 (1975).
303. Plaintiffs argument is essentially that it would be unjust to allow the state to collect
a 100% penalty when the plaintiff relied on the state's clerk, who failed to comply with the
statute. In reponse, the court noted that estoppel can only be used against the state in rare
cases. It referred to Jefferson National Bank v. Metropolitan Dade County, 271 So. 2d 207
(Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 277 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1972), where the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, noted that "[wihile the doctrine of estoppel can be applied against the state
or its subdivisions . . .. [i]t will be invoked only under very exceptional circumstances,
which must include some positive act on the part of an authorized official . . . ... Id. at 214.
Since it was not here faced with such a situation, the court affirmed the circuit court's
decision.
304. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
305. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
306. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
307. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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tutional despite imposing a one hundred percent penalty,"' and the
difficulties in collecting documentary stamp taxes. The court con-
cluded that the penalty imposed was not so oppressive that the
court should invade the legislative prerogative of determining what
was reasonable. The court left open the question of under what
circumstances the 100 percent penalty might be reduced, saying
only that "[in each instance the circumstances will be different,
and courts have no magic yardstick by which to reduce the penalty
based upon intentions and attitudes of taxpayers. '30 9
The District Court of Appeal, First District, answered this
question left open by the supreme court in Dominion by its decision
in Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v. State Department of Revenue.31°
Zuckerman and its joint venturer, Glick, acquired property from
Bayshore. They claimed Bayshore had acquired the property as a
trustee for them, and that the affixation of the stamps on the docu-
ments in the original transaction excused their use in the later
transfer. A hearing officer found that Bayshore had contracted to
buy the property in its corporate name, not as a trustee, and that it
took title in its own name, not as a trustee, and that it had used its
own funds in making the purchase. Thus, there was no trust rela-
tionship and the second transaction required the use of documen-
tary stamps. The Department of Revenue assessed a tax of
$55,649.70 and a penalty equal to that amount. The court reduced
the penalty to $5,000, calling it a "reasonable amount necessary for
protection of the State's interest." '' The court was concerned that
the Department of Revenue had abused its discretion to a point that
was unconscionable. In seeking authority to support its reduction of
the penalty, the court turned to Dominion Land & Title Corp. v.
Department of Revenue."2
Florida's statute does not have any provision for discretion as
to the amount of the penalty. The statute states that the failure to
affix stamps shall subject the persons liable to "[playment of [a]
penalty to the Department of Revenue equal to the purchase price
308. See Davis v. Becker, 309 Ky. 775, 219 S.W.2d 6 (1949); Brittain v. Robertson, 120
Miss. 684, 83 So. 4 (1919); Bennett v. Jones, 107 Miss. 880, 66 So. 277 (1914); State ex rel.
Hardy v. State Board of Equalization, 133 Mont. 43, 319 P.2d 1061 (1958).
309. 320 So. 2d at 818-19.
310. 339 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
311. Id. at 687.
312. 320 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1975).
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of the stamps not affixed." ' Any discretion as to this statute has
its origin in the language of the supreme court.
The court said the "Department of Revenue alone can not de-
termine the amount of the tax or penalty without judicial review; if
after such review the court finds that under the law a modified
penalty is due, by strict construction the court has its equitable
power to reduce it." ' There appears to be very little to construe.
The legislature has exercised what the court characterized as its
"plenary power ' 315 regarding taxation, and decided that the viola-
tion was to be punished by a 100 percent fine. The court upheld the
constitutional power of the legislature to do just that. The court,
however, then gave the judiciary the authority to strip the legisla-
ture of its power, and reduce the penalty imposed. The Zuckerman
court exercised this power and reduced the penalty to ten percent
of the value of the stamps not affixed. In such instances, in order
to reduce the penalty, a court must base its action on either the lack
of power by the legislature to pass such a statute or the violation of
a taxpayer's right. Since neither was shown here, the power source
of the equitable action of the court is questionable in view of the
explicit terms of the statute.
313. FLA. STAT. § 201.17(2)(b) (1975).
314. Dominion Land & Title Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 320 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla.
1975).
315. Id.
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